@article{MTMT:34779144,
	title = {When Tariffs Disrupt Global Supply Chains},
	url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34779144},
	author = {Grossman, Gene M. and Helpman, Elhanan and Redding, Stephen J.},
	doi = {10.1257/aer.20211519},
	journal-iso = {AM ECON REV},
	journal = {AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW},
	volume = {114},
	unique-id = {34779144},
	issn = {0002-8282},
	abstract = {We study unanticipated tariffs in a setting with firm-to-firm supply relationships. Firms conduct costly searches and negotiate with potential suppliers that pass a reservation level of match productivity. Global supply chains form in anticipation of free trade. Then, the home government surprises with an input tariff. This can lead to renegotiation with initial suppliers or search for replacements. Calibrating the model’s parameters to match initial import shares and the estimated responses to the US tariffs imposed on China, we find an overall welfare loss of 0.12 percent of GDP, with substantial contributions from changes in input sourcing and search costs. (JEL D72, F13, F14, L14, O19, P33)},
	year = {2024},
	eissn = {1944-7981},
	pages = {988-1029}
}

@article{MTMT:34758384,
	title = {The Economics of the Public Option: Evidence from Local Pharmaceutical Markets},
	url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34758384},
	author = {Atal, Juan Pablo and Cuesta, José Ignacio and González, Felipe and Otero, Cristóbal},
	doi = {10.1257/aer.20211547},
	journal-iso = {AM ECON REV},
	journal = {AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW},
	volume = {114},
	unique-id = {34758384},
	issn = {0002-8282},
	abstract = {We study the effects of competition by state-owned firms, leveraging the decentralized entry of public pharmacies to local markets in Chile. Public pharmacies sell the same drugs at a third of private pharmacy prices, because of stronger upstream bargaining and market power in the private sector, but are of lower quality. Public pharmacies induced market segmentation and price increases in the private sector, which benefited the switchers to the public option but harmed the stayers. The countrywide entry of public pharmacies would reduce yearly consumer drug expenditure by 1.6 percent. (JEL D22, I18, L32, L65, O14)},
	year = {2024},
	eissn = {1944-7981},
	pages = {615-644}
}

@article{MTMT:34086017,
	title = {Individuals and Organizations as Sources of State Effectiveness},
	url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34086017},
	author = {Best, Michael Carlos and Hjort, Jonas and Szakonyi, David},
	doi = {10.1257/aer.20191598},
	journal-iso = {AM ECON REV},
	journal = {AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW},
	volume = {113},
	unique-id = {34086017},
	issn = {0002-8282},
	abstract = {Bureaucrats implement policy. How important are they for a state’s productivity? And do the trade-offs between policies depend on their effectiveness? Using data on 16 million public purchases in Russia, we show that 39 percent of the variation in prices paid for narrowly defined items is due to the individual bureaucrats and organizations who manage procurement. Low-price buyers also display higher spending quality. Theory suggests that such differences in effectiveness can be pivotal for policy design. To illustrate, we show that a common one—bid preferences for domestic suppliers—substantially improves procurement performance, but only when implemented by ineffective bureaucrats. (JEL D73, H57, H83, L14, P26)},
	year = {2023},
	eissn = {1944-7981},
	pages = {2121-2167}
}

@article{MTMT:34316003,
	title = {The Old Boys' Club: Schmoozing and the Gender Gap},
	url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34316003},
	author = {Cullen, Zoe and Perez-Truglia, Ricardo},
	doi = {10.1257/aer.20210863},
	journal-iso = {AM ECON REV},
	journal = {AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW},
	volume = {113},
	unique-id = {34316003},
	issn = {0002-8282},
	abstract = {Offices are social places. Employees and managers take breaks together and talk about family and hobbies. In this study, we show that employees' social interactions with their managers can be advantageous for their careers, and that this phenomenon contrib-utes to the gender pay gap. We use administrative and survey data from a large financial institution and exploit quasi-random varia-tion induced by the rotation of managers. We provide evidence that when employees have more face-to-face interactions with their managers, they are promoted at a higher rate. This mechanism could explain a third of the gender gap in promotions at this firm. (JEL G21, J16, J31, J71, M12, M51, Z13)},
	year = {2023},
	eissn = {1944-7981},
	pages = {1703-1740},
	orcid-numbers = {Perez-Truglia, Ricardo/0000-0002-5141-8349}
}

@article{MTMT:34021483,
	title = {Occupational Exposure to Capital-Embodied Technical Change},
	url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34021483},
	author = {Caunedo, Julieta and Jaume, David and Keller, Elisa},
	doi = {10.1257/aer.20211478},
	journal-iso = {AM ECON REV},
	journal = {AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW},
	volume = {113},
	unique-id = {34021483},
	issn = {0002-8282},
	abstract = {We study differences in exposure to factor-biased technical change among occupations by providing the first measures of capital-embodied technical change (CETC) and of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor at the occupational level. We document sizable occupational heterogeneity in both measures, but quantitatively, it is the heterogeneity in factor substitutability that fuels workers’ exposure to CETC. In a general equilibrium model of worker sorting across occupations, CETC accounts for almost all of the observed labor reallocation in the US between 1984 and 2015. Absent occupational heterogeneity in factor substitutability, CETC accounts for only 17 percent of it (JEL I26, J16, J24, J31, O33)},
	year = {2023},
	eissn = {1944-7981},
	pages = {1642-1685}
}

@article{MTMT:34344388,
	title = {Information, Mobile Communication, and Referral Effectst},
	url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34344388},
	author = {Barwick, Panle Jia and Liu, Yanyan and Patacchini, Eleonora and Wu, Qi},
	doi = {10.1257/aer.20200187},
	journal-iso = {AM ECON REV},
	journal = {AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW},
	volume = {113},
	unique-id = {34344388},
	issn = {0002-8282},
	abstract = {This paper uses the universe of cellphone records from a Chinese telecommunication provider for a northern Chinese city to examine the role of information exchange in urban labor markets. We provide the first direct evidence of increased communication among referral pairs around job changes. Information provided by social contacts mitigates information asymmetry and improves labor market perfor-mance. (JEL D82, J62, O18, P23, P25, R23, Z13)},
	year = {2023},
	eissn = {1944-7981},
	pages = {1170-1207}
}

@article{MTMT:34311542,
	title = {The Costs of Job Displacement over the Business Cycle and Its Sources: Evidence from Germany},
	url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34311542},
	author = {Schmieder, Johannes F. and von Wachter, Till and Heining, Joerg},
	doi = {10.1257/aer.20200252},
	journal-iso = {AM ECON REV},
	journal = {AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW},
	volume = {113},
	unique-id = {34311542},
	issn = {0002-8282},
	abstract = {We document the sources behind the costs of job loss over the busi-ness cycle using administrative data from Germany. Losses in annual earnings after displacement are large, persistent, and highly cycli-cal, nearly doubling in size during downturns. A large part of the long-term earnings losses and their cyclicality is driven by declines in wages. Key to these long-lasting wage declines and their cyclical-ity are changes in employer characteristics, as displaced workers switch to lower-paying firms. These losses increase with duration of nonemployment. Changes in characteristics of displaced workers or displacing firms, and other post-job loss career outcomes explain little of the cyclicality. (JEL E24, E32, J31, J63, J64, J65)},
	year = {2023},
	eissn = {1944-7981},
	pages = {1208-1254}
}

@article{MTMT:34285127,
	title = {The Cost of Information: The Case of Constant Marginal Costs},
	url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34285127},
	author = {Pomatto, Luciano and Strack, Philipp and Tamuz, Omer},
	doi = {10.1257/aer.20190185},
	journal-iso = {AM ECON REV},
	journal = {AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW},
	volume = {113},
	unique-id = {34285127},
	issn = {0002-8282},
	abstract = {We develop an axiomatic theory of information acquisition that cap-tures the idea of constant marginal costs in information production: the cost of generating two independent signals is the sum of their costs, and generating a signal with probability half costs half its original cost. Together with Blackwell monotonicity and a continuity condition, these axioms determine the cost of a signal up to a vector of param-eters. These parameters have a clear economic interpretation and determine the difficulty of distinguishing states.},
	year = {2023},
	eissn = {1944-7981},
	pages = {1360-1393}
}

@article{MTMT:33720472,
	title = {Partisanship and Fiscal Policy in Economic Unions: Evidence from US States},
	url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33720472},
	author = {Carlino, Gerald and Drautzburg, Thorsten and Inman, Robert and Zarra, Nicholas},
	doi = {10.1257/aer.20210147},
	journal-iso = {AM ECON REV},
	journal = {AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW},
	volume = {113},
	unique-id = {33720472},
	issn = {0002-8282},
	abstract = {Partisanship of state governors affects the efficacy of US federal fiscal policy. Using close election data, we find partisan differences in the marginal propensity to spend federal intergovernmental transfers: Republican governors spend less than Democratic governors. Correspondingly, Republican-led states have lower debt, (delayed) lower taxes, and initially lower economic activity. A New Keynesian model of partisan states in a monetary union implies sizable aggregate effects: The intergovernmental transfer impact multiplier rises by 0.58 if Republican governors spend like Democratic governors, but due to delayed tax cuts, the long-run multiplier is higher with more Republican governors, generating an intertemporal policy trade-off. (JEL D72, E12, E62, H71, H72, H74, H77)},
	year = {2023},
	eissn = {1944-7981},
	pages = {701-737}
}

@article{MTMT:34599622,
	title = {Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses, and Adverse Selection},
	url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34599622},
	author = {Gershkov, Alex and Moldovanu, Benny and Strack, Philipp and Zhang, Mengxi},
	doi = {10.1257/aer.20221247},
	journal-iso = {AM ECON REV},
	journal = {AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW},
	volume = {113},
	unique-id = {34599622},
	issn = {0002-8282},
	abstract = {We study a generalization of the classical monopoly insurance prob-lem under adverse selection (see Stiglitz 1977) where we allow for a random distribution of losses , possibly correlated with the agent's risk parameter that is private information. Our model explains pat-terns of observed customer behavior and predicts insurance con-tracts most often observed in practice: these consist of menus of several deductible-premium pairs or menus of insurance with cov-erage limits-premium pairs. A main departure from the classical insurance literature is obtained here by endowing the agents with risk-averse preferences that can be represented by a dual utility func-tional (Yaari 1987). (JEL D81, D82, D86, D91, G22)},
	year = {2023},
	eissn = {1944-7981},
	pages = {2581-2614}
}