TY - JOUR AU - Radó, Márta K. AU - Kisfalusi, Dorottya AU - Laverty, Anthony A. AU - van Lenthe, Frank J. AU - Been, Jasper V. AU - Takács, Károly TI - Socio‐economic inequalities in smoking and drinking in adolescence: Assessment of social network dynamics JF - ADDICTION J2 - ADDICTION VL - 119 PY - 2024 IS - 3 SP - 488 EP - 498 PG - 11 SN - 0965-2140 DO - 10.1111/add.16384 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34398844 ID - 34398844 LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Pancotto, Francesca AU - Righi, Simone AU - Takács, Károly TI - Voluntary play increases cooperation in the presence of punishment: a lab in the field experiment JF - THEORY AND DECISION: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR MULTIDISCIPLINARY ADVANCES IN DECISION SCIENCE J2 - THEOR DECIS VL - 95 PY - 2023 SP - 405 EP - 428 PG - 24 SN - 0040-5833 DO - 10.1007/s11238-023-09929-9 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33992286 ID - 33992286 AB - Problems of cooperation have often been simplified as the choice between defection and cooperation, although in many empirical situations it is also possible to walk away from the interaction. We present the results of two lab-in-the-field experiments with a diverse pool of subjects who play optional and compulsory public goods games both with and without punishment. We find that the most important institution to foster cooperation is punishment, which is more effective in a compulsory game. In contrast to Rand and Nowak (Nat Commun 2(1):1-7, 2011), we find that loners are not responsible for anti-social punishment, which is mostly imputable to low-contributors (free-riders). Loners neither totally free-ride nor they significantly punish cooperators (or other types of players): they simply avoid all forms of participation whenever possible. LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Pápay, Boróka AU - Kubik, Bálint György AU - Galántai, Júlia AU - Takács, Károly TI - Gossip is distinct from other topics in spontaneous conversation JF - INTERSECTIONS: EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS J2 - INTERSECTIONS (HU) VL - 8 PY - 2022 IS - 4 SP - 149 EP - 178 PG - 30 SN - 2416-089X DO - 10.17356/ieejsp.v8i4.939 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33605476 ID - 33605476 AB - Gossip – talking about relevant others in their absence – is believed to constitute a large part of informal communication. The perception of the prevalence of gossip implies that it can be unambiguously identified and distinguished from other topics in spontaneous conversation. Its distinctiveness may be justified by multiple theoretical perspectives, including one that describes in-group gossip as an informal device for enforcing norms and punishing norm violators, and another that claims that gossip is used to release frustration and communicate envy. If the ultimate reason for gossip is to facilitate social bonding between the sender and the receiver, however, this would not differentiate gossip from other conversational topics that provide social enjoyment, such as entertainment and food. In a novel contribution, we explore the topics included in a corpus containing 550 hours of unfiltered spontaneous conversation and identify using LDA topic modeling whether some topics are unambiguously prominent in in-group gossip. The explorative approach is integrated with the manual annotation of instances of gossip across the entire corpus. We identified coherent topics of in-group gossip that are clearly different from those of small talk and storytelling. Our analysis finds that feelings, intentions, and opinions are frequently expressed in in-group gossip, more than habits, manners, and behavior. In-group gossip topics are characterized by more words associated with anger, in line with theoretical perspectives that attribute the motives of norm enhancement and punishment or frustration and envy to gossip. LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Estevez, Jose Luis AU - Takács, Károly TI - Brokering or Sitting Between Two Chairs? A Group Perspective on Workplace Gossip JF - FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY J2 - FRONT PSYCHOL VL - 13 PY - 2022 PG - 16 SN - 1664-1078 DO - 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.815383 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33419168 ID - 33419168 AB - Brokerage is a central concept in the organization literature. It has been argued that individuals in broker positions-i.e., connecting otherwise disconnected parts within a firm's social network-can control the flow of information. It would imply their increased relevance in workplace gossip. This allegation, however, has not been addressed empirically yet. To fill this gap, we apply social network analysis techniques to relational data from six organizations in Hungary. First, we identify informal groups and individuals in broker positions. Then, we use this information to predict the likelihood with which positive or negative gossip is reported. We find more gossip when the sender and receiver are part of the same group and more positive gossip about in-group rather than out-group targets. Individuals in broker positions are more likely the senders and targets of negative gossip. Finally, even if both the brokers and the boss(es) are the targets of their colleagues' negative gossip, the combination of the two categories (bosses in broker positions) does not predict more negative gossip anymore. Results are discussed in relation to the theoretical accounts on brokerage that emphasize its power for information control but fail to recognize the pitfalls of being in such positions. LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Takács, Károly TI - A Reputation-Centered Theory of Human Cooperation and Social Organization JF - Sociologica J2 - Sociologica VL - 16 PY - 2022 IS - 2 SP - 11 EP - 51 PG - 41 SN - 1971-8853 DO - 10.6092/issn.1971-8853/14196 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33271662 ID - 33271662 LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Számadó, Szabolcs AU - Samu, Flóra AU - Takács, Károly TI - Condition-dependent trade-offs maintain honest signalling JF - ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE J2 - R SOC OPEN SCI VL - 9 PY - 2022 IS - 10 PG - 17 SN - 2054-5703 DO - 10.1098/rsos.220335 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33205038 ID - 33205038 N1 - Funding Agency and Grant Number: National Research, Development and Innovation Office-NKFIH(OTKA); European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and Innovation Programme [K 132250]; [648693] Funding text: S.S., F.S. and K.T. were supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office-NKFIH(OTKA) grant no. K 132250 (PI: S.S.), and by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and Innovation Programme (grant agreement no. 648693, PI: K.T.). The funding agencies had no role in the study design, analyses or publication AB - How and why animals and humans signal reliably is a key issue in biology and social sciences that needs to be understood to explain the evolution of communication. In situations in which the receiver needs to differentiate between low- and high-quality signallers, once a ruling paradigm, the Handicap Principle has claimed that honest signals have to be costly to produce. Subsequent game theoretical models, however, highlighted that honest signals are not necessarily costly. Honesty is maintained by the potential cost of cheating: by the difference in the marginal benefit to marginal cost for low versus high-quality signallers; i.e. by differential trade-offs. Owing to the difficulties of manipulating signal costs and benefits, there is lack of empirical tests of these predictions. We present the results of a laboratory decision-making experiment with human participants to test the role of equilibrium signal cost and signalling trade-offs for the development of honest communication. We found that the trade-off manipulation had a much higher influence on the reliability of communication than the manipulation of the equilibrium cost of signal. Contrary to the predictions of the Handicap Principle, negative production cost promoted honesty at a very high level in the differential trade-off condition. LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - DATA AU - Vörös, András AU - Boda, Zsófia AU - Néray, Bálint AU - Pál, Judit AU - Kisfalusi, Dorottya AU - Samu, Flóra AU - Vit, Eszter AU - Radó, Márta AU - Habsz, Lilla AU - Csaba, Zoltán László AU - Lőrincz, László AU - Mandácskó, Eszter AU - Panyik, Barbara AU - Varga, Kinga AU - Mezei, Gabriella AU - Makovi, Kinga AU - Boldvai-Pethes, Laura AU - Havelda, Anikó AU - Bartus, Tamás AU - Takács, Károly TI - Wired into Each Other: Network Dynamics of Adolescents in Hungarian Secondary Schools: 2010-2013 PY - 2022 DO - 10.5255/UKDA-SN-855460 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33092586 ID - 33092586 LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Righi, Simone AU - Takács, Károly TI - Gossip: Perspective Taking to Establish Cooperation JF - DYNAMIC GAMES AND APPLICATIONS J2 - DYN GAMES APPL VL - 12 PY - 2022 SP - 1086 EP - 1100 PG - 15 SN - 2153-0785 DO - 10.1007/s13235-022-00440-4 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/32772695 ID - 32772695 N1 - Department of Economics, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Fondamenta S. Giobbe, 873, Venice, 30121, Italy The Institute for Analytical Sociology, Linköping University, Kopparhammaren 7, Kungsgatan 56, Norrköping, 601 74, Sweden Computational Social Science - Research Center for Educational and Network Studies (CSS-RECENS), Centre for Social Sciences, Tóth Kálmán u. 4., Budapest, 1097, Hungary Export Date: 22 November 2022 Correspondence Address: Righi, S.; Department of Economics, Fondamenta S. Giobbe, 873, Italy; email: simone.righi@unive.it LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Giardini, Francesca AU - Balliet, Daniel AU - Power, Eleanor A. AU - Számadó, Szabolcs AU - Takács, Károly TI - Four Puzzles of Reputation-Based Cooperation: Content, Process, Honesty, and Structure JF - HUMAN NATURE-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY BIOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVE J2 - HUM NAT-INT BIOS VL - 33 PY - 2022 SP - 43 EP - 61 PG - 19 SN - 1045-6767 DO - 10.1007/s12110-021-09419-3 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/32638620 ID - 32638620 N1 - Funding Agency and Grant Number: Linkoping University; National Research, Development and Innovation Office - NKFIH (OTKA) grantOrszagos Tudomanyos Kutatasi Alapprogramok (OTKA) [K 132250]; European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's research and innovation programmeEuropean Research Council (ERC) [648693] Funding text: Open access funding provided by Linkoping University. S.S. and K.T. were supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office - NKFIH (OTKA) grant K 132250 and by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's research and innovation programme (grant agreement no. 648693). AB - Research in various disciplines has highlighted that humans are uniquely able to solve the problem of cooperation through the informal mechanisms of reputation and gossip. Reputation coordinates the evaluative judgments of individuals about one another. Direct observation of actions and communication are the essential routes that are used to establish and update reputations. In large groups, where opportunities for direct observation are limited, gossip becomes an important channel to share individual perceptions and evaluations of others that can be used to condition cooperative action. Although reputation and gossip might consequently support large-scale human cooperation, four puzzles need to be resolved to understand the operation of reputation-based mechanisms. First, we need empirical evidence of the processes and content that form reputations and how this may vary cross-culturally. Second, we lack an understanding of how reputation is determined from the muddle of imperfect, biased inputs people receive. Third, coordination between individuals is only possible if reputation sharing and signaling is to a large extent reliable and valid. Communication, however, is not necessarily honest and reliable, so theoretical and empirical work is needed to understand how gossip and reputation can effectively promote cooperation despite the circulation of dishonest gossip. Fourth, reputation is not constructed in a social vacuum; hence we need a better understanding of the way in which the structure of interactions affects the efficiency of gossip for establishing reputations and fostering cooperation. LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Estévez, José Luis AU - Kisfalusi, Dorottya AU - Takács, Károly TI - More than one’s negative ties: The role of friends’ antipathies in high school gossip JF - SOCIAL NETWORKS J2 - SOC NETWORKS VL - 70 PY - 2022 SP - 77 EP - 89 PG - 13 SN - 0378-8733 DO - 10.1016/j.socnet.2021.11.009 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/32513451 ID - 32513451 LA - English DB - MTMT ER -