@article{MTMT:34398844, title = {Socio‐economic inequalities in smoking and drinking in adolescence: Assessment of social network dynamics}, url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34398844}, author = {Radó, Márta K. and Kisfalusi, Dorottya and Laverty, Anthony A. and van Lenthe, Frank J. and Been, Jasper V. and Takács, Károly}, doi = {10.1111/add.16384}, journal-iso = {ADDICTION}, journal = {ADDICTION}, volume = {119}, unique-id = {34398844}, issn = {0965-2140}, year = {2024}, eissn = {1360-0443}, pages = {488-498}, orcid-numbers = {Radó, Márta K./0000-0002-1676-5951; Laverty, Anthony A./0000-0003-1318-8439; van Lenthe, Frank J./0000-0001-6402-7075; Been, Jasper V./0000-0002-4907-6466; Takács, Károly/0000-0001-9126-3233} } @article{MTMT:33992286, title = {Voluntary play increases cooperation in the presence of punishment: a lab in the field experiment}, url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33992286}, author = {Pancotto, Francesca and Righi, Simone and Takács, Károly}, doi = {10.1007/s11238-023-09929-9}, journal-iso = {THEOR DECIS}, journal = {THEORY AND DECISION: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR MULTIDISCIPLINARY ADVANCES IN DECISION SCIENCE}, volume = {95}, unique-id = {33992286}, issn = {0040-5833}, abstract = {Problems of cooperation have often been simplified as the choice between defection and cooperation, although in many empirical situations it is also possible to walk away from the interaction. We present the results of two lab-in-the-field experiments with a diverse pool of subjects who play optional and compulsory public goods games both with and without punishment. We find that the most important institution to foster cooperation is punishment, which is more effective in a compulsory game. In contrast to Rand and Nowak (Nat Commun 2(1):1-7, 2011), we find that loners are not responsible for anti-social punishment, which is mostly imputable to low-contributors (free-riders). Loners neither totally free-ride nor they significantly punish cooperators (or other types of players): they simply avoid all forms of participation whenever possible.}, keywords = {COOPERATION; Punishment; EXIT; Optional public goods game; Lab in the field experiment}, year = {2023}, eissn = {1573-7187}, pages = {405-428}, orcid-numbers = {Pancotto, Francesca/0000-0002-4670-0673; Takács, Károly/0000-0001-9126-3233} } @article{MTMT:33605476, title = {Gossip is distinct from other topics in spontaneous conversation}, url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33605476}, author = {Pápay, Boróka and Kubik, Bálint György and Galántai, Júlia and Takács, Károly}, doi = {10.17356/ieejsp.v8i4.939}, journal-iso = {INTERSECTIONS (HU)}, journal = {INTERSECTIONS: EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS}, volume = {8}, unique-id = {33605476}, abstract = {Gossip – talking about relevant others in their absence – is believed to constitute a large part of informal communication. The perception of the prevalence of gossip implies that it can be unambiguously identified and distinguished from other topics in spontaneous conversation. Its distinctiveness may be justified by multiple theoretical perspectives, including one that describes in-group gossip as an informal device for enforcing norms and punishing norm violators, and another that claims that gossip is used to release frustration and communicate envy. If the ultimate reason for gossip is to facilitate social bonding between the sender and the receiver, however, this would not differentiate gossip from other conversational topics that provide social enjoyment, such as entertainment and food. In a novel contribution, we explore the topics included in a corpus containing 550 hours of unfiltered spontaneous conversation and identify using LDA topic modeling whether some topics are unambiguously prominent in in-group gossip. The explorative approach is integrated with the manual annotation of instances of gossip across the entire corpus. We identified coherent topics of in-group gossip that are clearly different from those of small talk and storytelling. Our analysis finds that feelings, intentions, and opinions are frequently expressed in in-group gossip, more than habits, manners, and behavior. In-group gossip topics are characterized by more words associated with anger, in line with theoretical perspectives that attribute the motives of norm enhancement and punishment or frustration and envy to gossip.}, year = {2022}, eissn = {2416-089X}, pages = {149-178}, orcid-numbers = {Takács, Károly/0000-0001-9126-3233} } @article{MTMT:33419168, title = {Brokering or Sitting Between Two Chairs? A Group Perspective on Workplace Gossip}, url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33419168}, author = {Estevez, Jose Luis and Takács, Károly}, doi = {10.3389/fpsyg.2022.815383}, journal-iso = {FRONT PSYCHOL}, journal = {FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY}, volume = {13}, unique-id = {33419168}, issn = {1664-1078}, abstract = {Brokerage is a central concept in the organization literature. It has been argued that individuals in broker positions-i.e., connecting otherwise disconnected parts within a firm's social network-can control the flow of information. It would imply their increased relevance in workplace gossip. This allegation, however, has not been addressed empirically yet. To fill this gap, we apply social network analysis techniques to relational data from six organizations in Hungary. First, we identify informal groups and individuals in broker positions. Then, we use this information to predict the likelihood with which positive or negative gossip is reported. We find more gossip when the sender and receiver are part of the same group and more positive gossip about in-group rather than out-group targets. Individuals in broker positions are more likely the senders and targets of negative gossip. Finally, even if both the brokers and the boss(es) are the targets of their colleagues' negative gossip, the combination of the two categories (bosses in broker positions) does not predict more negative gossip anymore. Results are discussed in relation to the theoretical accounts on brokerage that emphasize its power for information control but fail to recognize the pitfalls of being in such positions.}, keywords = {multilevel analysis; Brokerage; Organizational networks; Workplace gossip; informal groups}, year = {2022}, eissn = {1664-1078}, orcid-numbers = {Takács, Károly/0000-0001-9126-3233} } @article{MTMT:33271662, title = {A Reputation-Centered Theory of Human Cooperation and Social Organization}, url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33271662}, author = {Takács, Károly}, doi = {10.6092/issn.1971-8853/14196}, journal-iso = {Sociologica}, journal = {Sociologica}, volume = {16}, unique-id = {33271662}, issn = {1971-8853}, year = {2022}, pages = {11-51}, orcid-numbers = {Takács, Károly/0000-0001-9126-3233} } @article{MTMT:33205038, title = {Condition-dependent trade-offs maintain honest signalling}, url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33205038}, author = {Számadó, Szabolcs and Samu, Flóra and Takács, Károly}, doi = {10.1098/rsos.220335}, journal-iso = {R SOC OPEN SCI}, journal = {ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE}, volume = {9}, unique-id = {33205038}, issn = {2054-5703}, abstract = {How and why animals and humans signal reliably is a key issue in biology and social sciences that needs to be understood to explain the evolution of communication. In situations in which the receiver needs to differentiate between low- and high-quality signallers, once a ruling paradigm, the Handicap Principle has claimed that honest signals have to be costly to produce. Subsequent game theoretical models, however, highlighted that honest signals are not necessarily costly. Honesty is maintained by the potential cost of cheating: by the difference in the marginal benefit to marginal cost for low versus high-quality signallers; i.e. by differential trade-offs. Owing to the difficulties of manipulating signal costs and benefits, there is lack of empirical tests of these predictions. We present the results of a laboratory decision-making experiment with human participants to test the role of equilibrium signal cost and signalling trade-offs for the development of honest communication. We found that the trade-off manipulation had a much higher influence on the reliability of communication than the manipulation of the equilibrium cost of signal. Contrary to the predictions of the Handicap Principle, negative production cost promoted honesty at a very high level in the differential trade-off condition.}, keywords = {EVOLUTION; COMMUNICATION; COOPERATION; Sexual selection; cost; Handicap; PREFERENCES; HANDICAP PRINCIPLE; Deception; honest signalling; Costly signalling; Biological signals; condition-dependent trade-offs}, year = {2022}, eissn = {2054-5703}, orcid-numbers = {Számadó, Szabolcs/0000-0003-2204-9705; Takács, Károly/0000-0001-9126-3233} } @{MTMT:33092586, title = {Wired into Each Other: Network Dynamics of Adolescents in Hungarian Secondary Schools: 2010-2013}, url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33092586}, author = {Vörös, András and Boda, Zsófia and Néray, Bálint and Pál, Judit and Kisfalusi, Dorottya and Samu, Flóra and Vit, Eszter and Radó, Márta and Habsz, Lilla and Csaba, Zoltán László and Lőrincz, László and Mandácskó, Eszter and Panyik, Barbara and Varga, Kinga and Mezei, Gabriella and Makovi, Kinga and Boldvai-Pethes, Laura and Havelda, Anikó and Bartus, Tamás and Takács, Károly}, doi = {10.5255/UKDA-SN-855460}, unique-id = {33092586}, year = {2022}, orcid-numbers = {Bartus, Tamás/0000-0002-8356-9408; Takács, Károly/0000-0001-9126-3233} } @article{MTMT:32772695, title = {Gossip: Perspective Taking to Establish Cooperation}, url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/32772695}, author = {Righi, Simone and Takács, Károly}, doi = {10.1007/s13235-022-00440-4}, journal-iso = {DYN GAMES APPL}, journal = {DYNAMIC GAMES AND APPLICATIONS}, volume = {12}, unique-id = {32772695}, issn = {2153-0785}, year = {2022}, eissn = {2153-0793}, pages = {1086-1100}, orcid-numbers = {Righi, Simone/0000-0001-9821-8451; Takács, Károly/0000-0001-9126-3233} } @article{MTMT:32638620, title = {Four Puzzles of Reputation-Based Cooperation: Content, Process, Honesty, and Structure}, url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/32638620}, author = {Giardini, Francesca and Balliet, Daniel and Power, Eleanor A. and Számadó, Szabolcs and Takács, Károly}, doi = {10.1007/s12110-021-09419-3}, journal-iso = {HUM NAT-INT BIOS}, journal = {HUMAN NATURE-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY BIOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVE}, volume = {33}, unique-id = {32638620}, issn = {1045-6767}, abstract = {Research in various disciplines has highlighted that humans are uniquely able to solve the problem of cooperation through the informal mechanisms of reputation and gossip. Reputation coordinates the evaluative judgments of individuals about one another. Direct observation of actions and communication are the essential routes that are used to establish and update reputations. In large groups, where opportunities for direct observation are limited, gossip becomes an important channel to share individual perceptions and evaluations of others that can be used to condition cooperative action. Although reputation and gossip might consequently support large-scale human cooperation, four puzzles need to be resolved to understand the operation of reputation-based mechanisms. First, we need empirical evidence of the processes and content that form reputations and how this may vary cross-culturally. Second, we lack an understanding of how reputation is determined from the muddle of imperfect, biased inputs people receive. Third, coordination between individuals is only possible if reputation sharing and signaling is to a large extent reliable and valid. Communication, however, is not necessarily honest and reliable, so theoretical and empirical work is needed to understand how gossip and reputation can effectively promote cooperation despite the circulation of dishonest gossip. Fourth, reputation is not constructed in a social vacuum; hence we need a better understanding of the way in which the structure of interactions affects the efficiency of gossip for establishing reputations and fostering cooperation.}, keywords = {EVOLUTION; EVOLUTION; COOPERATION; SEX-DIFFERENCES; anthropology; INDIRECT RECIPROCITY; PARTNER CHOICE; REPUTATION; social information; gossip; gossip; biological markets; PROMOTE COOPERATION; FREE-RIDERS}, year = {2022}, eissn = {1936-4776}, pages = {43-61}, orcid-numbers = {Balliet, Daniel/0000-0001-5365-9675; Power, Eleanor A./0000-0002-3064-2050; Számadó, Szabolcs/0000-0003-2204-9705; Takács, Károly/0000-0001-9126-3233} } @article{MTMT:32513451, title = {More than one’s negative ties: The role of friends’ antipathies in high school gossip}, url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/32513451}, author = {Estévez, José Luis and Kisfalusi, Dorottya and Takács, Károly}, doi = {10.1016/j.socnet.2021.11.009}, journal-iso = {SOC NETWORKS}, journal = {SOCIAL NETWORKS}, volume = {70}, unique-id = {32513451}, issn = {0378-8733}, year = {2022}, eissn = {1879-2111}, pages = {77-89}, orcid-numbers = {Takács, Károly/0000-0001-9126-3233} }