TY - JOUR AU - Biró, Péter AU - Csáji, Gergely Kál TI - Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains JF - GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR J2 - GAME ECON BEHAV VL - 145 PY - 2024 SP - 217 EP - 238 PG - 22 SN - 0899-8256 DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.010 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34764211 ID - 34764211 N1 - Open access LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Biró, Péter AU - Bozóki, Sándor AU - Király, Tamás AU - Kristály, Alexandru TI - Optimization methods and algorithms JF - CENTRAL EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH J2 - CEJOR VL - 32 PY - 2024 SP - 1 EP - 9 PG - 9 SN - 1435-246X DO - 10.1007/s10100-023-00898-6 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34512778 ID - 34512778 N1 - Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (HUN-REN KRTK), HUN-REN Institute of Economics, Budapest, Hungary Department of Operations Research and Actuarial Sciences, Institute of Operations and Decision Sciences, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary Laboratory on Engineering and Management Intelligence, HUN-REN Institute for Computer Science and Control (HUN-REN SZTAKI), Research Group of Operations Research and Decision Systems, Budapest, Hungary Department of Operations Research, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary Department of Economics, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania Institute of Applied Mathematics, Óbuda University, Budapest, Hungary Export Date: 25 March 2024 Correspondence Address: Bozóki, S.; Department of Operations Research and Actuarial Sciences, Hungary; email: bozoki.sandor@sztaki.hun-ren.hu Funding text 1: The contribution of Tamás Kis, Péter Györgyi and Markó Horváth to Sect. 1 is highly appreciated. AB - Recent results of three areas, pickup and delivery, optimal mass transportation, matching under preferences are highlighted. The topics themselves have been selected from the active research fields of Hungarian Operations Research. We also provide a short summary of selected research results from the 34th Hungarian Operations Research Conference, held in Cegléd, Hungary, August 31–September 2, 2021. LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Biró, Péter AU - Klijn, F AU - Klimentova, X AU - Viana, A TI - Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange JF - MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH J2 - MATH OPER RES PY - 2024 PG - 35 SN - 0364-765X DO - 10.1287/moor.2022.0092 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34197395 ID - 34197395 AB - In a housing market of Shapley and Scarf, each agent is endowed with one indivisible object and has preferences over all objects. An allocation of the objects is in the (strong) core if there exists no (weakly) blocking coalition. We show that, for strict preferences, the unique strong core allocation “respects improvement”—if an agent’s object becomes more desirable for some other agents, then the agent’s allotment in the unique strong core allocation weakly improves. We extend this result to weak preferences for both the strong core (conditional on nonemptiness) and the set of competitive allocations (using probabilistic allocations and stochastic dominance). There are no counterparts of the latter two results in the two-sided matching literature. We provide examples to show how our results break down when there is a bound on the length of exchange cycles. Respecting improvements is an important property for applications of the housing markets model, such as kidney exchange: it incentivizes each patient to bring the best possible set of donors to the market. We conduct computer simulations using markets that resemble the pools of kidney exchange programs. We compare the game-theoretical solutions with current techniques (maximum size and maximum weight allocations) in terms of violations of the respecting improvement property. We find that game-theoretical solutions fare much better at respecting improvements even when exchange cycles are bounded, and they do so at a low efficiency cost. As a stepping stone for our simulations, we provide novel integer programming formulations for computing core, competitive, and strong core allocations. LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Matyasi, L AU - Biró, Péter TI - Testing re-optimisation strategies in international kidney exchange programmes by the ENCKEP simulator JF - CENTRAL EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH J2 - CEJOR PY - 2024 PG - 23 SN - 1435-246X DO - 10.1007/s10100-023-00880-2 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34143185 ID - 34143185 AB - We tested re-optimisation strategies for international kidney exchange programmes using the simulator developed by the ENCKEP COST Action. Kidney exchange programmes (KEPs) are operating in most of the European countries to facilitate the exchange of kidney donors for the recipients with incompatible living donors. The optimal solutions for national and international KEPs are typically selected in every three months based on the compatibilities estimated on the individual immunological data. However, these estimations are not always accurate, and if a positive crossmatch is found in the laboratory crossmatch tests then the corresponding exchange cycle (or chain) must be cancelled. Depending on the matching process, the coordinators may use different re-optimisation strategies to repair the failed solutions. We examine the effects of using multiple rounds of re-optimisation with different optimisation strategies, such as fixing good cycles in the intermediate solutions or prioritising transplants with negative crossmatch tests in previous rounds. In the context of international KEPs we also consider the possibility of testing and prioritising national transplants in the solutions. We measure the performance of these policies regarding the number of transplants and the number of compatibility tests conducted in a time period. By extending our results presented in [16], we performed simulations for a large number of instances to measure the effects of various re-optimisation policies. Our main findings show a clear trade-off in the number of transplants versus the number of tests and re-optimisation rounds. LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Aziz, H AU - Baychkov, A AU - Biró, Péter TI - Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching JF - MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING J2 - MATH PROGRAM VL - 203 PY - 2024 SP - 247 EP - 269 PG - 23 SN - 0025-5610 DO - 10.1007/s10107-022-01917-1 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33373446 ID - 33373446 N1 - Open access AB - We introduce a new two-sided stable matching problem that describes the summer internship matching practice of an Australian university. The model is a case between two models of Kamada and Kojima on matchings with distributional constraints. We study three solution concepts, the strong and weak stability concepts proposed by Kamada and Kojima, and a new one in between the two, called cutoff stability. Kamada and Kojima showed that a strongly stable matching may not exist in their most restricted model with disjoint regional quotas. Our first result is that checking its existence is NP-hard. We then show that a cutoff stable matching exists not just for the summer internship problem but also for the general matching model with arbitrary heredity constraints. We present an algorithm to compute a cutoff stable matching and show that it runs in polynomial time in our special case of summer internship model. However, we also show that finding a maximum size cutoff stable matching is NP-hard, but we provide a Mixed Integer Linear Program formulation for this optimisation problem. LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Benedek, Márton AU - Biró, Péter AU - Johnson, M AU - Paulusma, D AU - Ye, X TI - The complexity of matching games. a survey TS - a survey JF - JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH J2 - J ARTIF INTELL RES VL - 77 PY - 2023 SP - 459 EP - 485 PG - 27 SN - 1076-9757 DO - 10.1613/jair.1.14281 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34020939 ID - 34020939 N1 - Open access AB - Matching games naturally generalize assignment games, a well-known class of cooperative games. Interest in matching games has grown recently due to some breakthrough results and new applications. This state-of-the-art survey provides an overview of matching games and extensions, such as b-matching games and partitioned matching games; the latter originating from the emerging area of international kidney exchange. In this survey we focus on computational complexity aspects of various game-theoretical solution concepts, such as the core, nucleolus and Shapley value, when the input is restricted to a matching game or one of its variants. LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Klimentova, X AU - Biró, Péter AU - Viana, A AU - Costa, V AU - Pedroso, J P TI - Novel Integer Programming models for the stable kidney exchange problem JF - EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH J2 - EJOR VL - 307 PY - 2023 IS - 3 SP - 1391 EP - 1407 PG - 17 SN - 0377-2217 DO - 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.09.031 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33121284 ID - 33121284 N1 - Cited By :1 Export Date: 21 September 2023 CODEN: EJORD LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Biró, Péter AU - Gyetvai, Márton TI - Online voluntary mentoring. Optimising the assignment of students and mentors TS - Optimising the assignment of students and mentors JF - EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH J2 - EJOR VL - 307 PY - 2023 IS - 1 SP - 392 EP - 405 PG - 14 SN - 0377-2217 DO - 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.08.008 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33047373 ID - 33047373 N1 - Open access LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - CHAP AU - Biró, Péter AU - Hassidim, A AU - Romm, A AU - Shorrer, R I AU - Sovagó, S ED - ACM, null TI - The Large Core of College Admission Markets. Theory and Evidence TS - Theory and Evidence T2 - EC '22 Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation PB - Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) CY - New York, New York SN - 9781450391504 PY - 2022 SP - 958 EP - 959 PG - 2 DO - 10.1145/3490486.3538369 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34138628 ID - 34138628 LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - GEN AU - Sziklai, Balázs AU - Biró, Péter AU - Csató, L TI - The efficacy of tournament designs PY - 2022 PG - 26 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33690766 ID - 33690766 LA - English DB - MTMT ER -