@article{MTMT:34764211,
	title = {Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains},
	url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34764211},
	author = {Biró, Péter and Csáji, Gergely Kál},
	doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.010},
	journal-iso = {GAME ECON BEHAV},
	journal = {GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR},
	volume = {145},
	unique-id = {34764211},
	issn = {0899-8256},
	year = {2024},
	eissn = {1090-2473},
	pages = {217-238}
}

@article{MTMT:34512778,
	title = {Optimization methods and algorithms},
	url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34512778},
	author = {Biró, Péter and Bozóki, Sándor and Király, Tamás and Kristály, Alexandru},
	doi = {10.1007/s10100-023-00898-6},
	journal-iso = {CEJOR},
	journal = {CENTRAL EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH},
	volume = {32},
	unique-id = {34512778},
	issn = {1435-246X},
	abstract = {Recent results of three areas, pickup and delivery, optimal mass transportation, matching under preferences are highlighted. The topics themselves have been selected from the active research fields of Hungarian Operations Research. We also provide a short summary of selected research results from the 34th Hungarian Operations Research Conference, held in Cegléd, Hungary, August 31–September 2, 2021.},
	year = {2024},
	eissn = {1613-9178},
	pages = {1-9},
	orcid-numbers = {Bozóki, Sándor/0000-0003-4170-4613; Király, Tamás/0000-0001-7218-2112}
}

@article{MTMT:34197395,
	title = {Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange},
	url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34197395},
	author = {Biró, Péter and Klijn, F and Klimentova, X and Viana, A},
	doi = {10.1287/moor.2022.0092},
	journal-iso = {MATH OPER RES},
	journal = {MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH},
	unique-id = {34197395},
	issn = {0364-765X},
	abstract = {In a housing market of Shapley and Scarf, each agent is endowed with one indivisible object and has preferences over all objects. An allocation of the objects is in the (strong) core if there exists no (weakly) blocking coalition. We show that, for strict preferences, the unique strong core allocation “respects improvement”—if an agent’s object becomes more desirable for some other agents, then the agent’s allotment in the unique strong core allocation weakly improves. We extend this result to weak preferences for both the strong core (conditional on nonemptiness) and the set of competitive allocations (using probabilistic allocations and stochastic dominance). There are no counterparts of the latter two results in the two-sided matching literature. We provide examples to show how our results break down when there is a bound on the length of exchange cycles. Respecting improvements is an important property for applications of the housing markets model, such as kidney exchange: it incentivizes each patient to bring the best possible set of donors to the market. We conduct computer simulations using markets that resemble the pools of kidney exchange programs. We compare the game-theoretical solutions with current techniques (maximum size and maximum weight allocations) in terms of violations of the respecting improvement property. We find that game-theoretical solutions fare much better at respecting improvements even when exchange cycles are bounded, and they do so at a low efficiency cost. As a stepping stone for our simulations, we provide novel integer programming formulations for computing core, competitive, and strong core allocations.},
	keywords = {CORE; Integer programming; Housing market; Kidney Exchange Programs; respecting improvement; competitive allocations},
	year = {2024},
	eissn = {1526-5471},
	orcid-numbers = {Klijn, F/0000-0001-7255-6954; Klimentova, X/0000-0003-1085-0810; Viana, A/0000-0001-5932-5203}
}

@article{MTMT:34143185,
	title = {Testing re-optimisation strategies in international kidney exchange programmes by the ENCKEP simulator},
	url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34143185},
	author = {Matyasi, L and Biró, Péter},
	doi = {10.1007/s10100-023-00880-2},
	journal-iso = {CEJOR},
	journal = {CENTRAL EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH},
	unique-id = {34143185},
	issn = {1435-246X},
	abstract = {We tested re-optimisation strategies for international kidney exchange programmes using the simulator developed by the ENCKEP COST Action. Kidney exchange programmes (KEPs) are operating in most of the European countries to facilitate the exchange of kidney donors for the recipients with incompatible living donors. The optimal solutions for national and international KEPs are typically selected in every three months based on the compatibilities estimated on the individual immunological data. However, these estimations are not always accurate, and if a positive crossmatch is found in the laboratory crossmatch tests then the corresponding exchange cycle (or chain) must be cancelled. Depending on the matching process, the coordinators may use different re-optimisation strategies to repair the failed solutions. We examine the effects of using multiple rounds of re-optimisation with different optimisation strategies, such as fixing good cycles in the intermediate solutions or prioritising transplants with negative crossmatch tests in previous rounds. In the context of international KEPs we also consider the possibility of testing and prioritising national transplants in the solutions. We measure the performance of these policies regarding the number of transplants and the number of compatibility tests conducted in a time period. By extending our results presented in [16], we performed simulations for a large number of instances to measure the effects of various re-optimisation policies. Our main findings show a clear trade-off in the number of transplants versus the number of tests and re-optimisation rounds.},
	year = {2024},
	eissn = {1613-9178}
}

@article{MTMT:33373446,
	title = {Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching},
	url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33373446},
	author = {Aziz, H and Baychkov, A and Biró, Péter},
	doi = {10.1007/s10107-022-01917-1},
	journal-iso = {MATH PROGRAM},
	journal = {MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING},
	volume = {203},
	unique-id = {33373446},
	issn = {0025-5610},
	abstract = {We introduce a new two-sided stable matching problem that describes the summer internship matching practice of an Australian university. The model is a case between two models of Kamada and Kojima on matchings with distributional constraints. We study three solution concepts, the strong and weak stability concepts proposed by Kamada and Kojima, and a new one in between the two, called cutoff stability. Kamada and Kojima showed that a strongly stable matching may not exist in their most restricted model with disjoint regional quotas. Our first result is that checking its existence is NP-hard. We then show that a cutoff stable matching exists not just for the summer internship problem but also for the general matching model with arbitrary heredity constraints. We present an algorithm to compute a cutoff stable matching and show that it runs in polynomial time in our special case of summer internship model. However, we also show that finding a maximum size cutoff stable matching is NP-hard, but we provide a Mixed Integer Linear Program formulation for this optimisation problem.},
	year = {2024},
	eissn = {1436-4646},
	pages = {247-269}
}

@article{MTMT:34020939,
	title = {The complexity of matching games. a survey},
	url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34020939},
	author = {Benedek, Márton and Biró, Péter and Johnson, M and Paulusma, D and Ye, X},
	doi = {10.1613/jair.1.14281},
	journal-iso = {J ARTIF INTELL RES},
	journal = {JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH},
	volume = {77},
	unique-id = {34020939},
	issn = {1076-9757},
	abstract = {Matching games naturally generalize assignment games, a well-known class of cooperative games. Interest in matching games has grown recently due to some breakthrough results and new applications. This state-of-the-art survey provides an overview of matching games and extensions, such as b-matching games and partitioned matching games; the latter originating from the emerging area of international kidney exchange. In this survey we focus on computational complexity aspects of various game-theoretical solution concepts, such as the core, nucleolus and Shapley value, when the input is restricted to a matching game or one of its variants.},
	year = {2023},
	eissn = {1943-5037},
	pages = {459-485}
}

@article{MTMT:33121284,
	title = {Novel Integer Programming models for the stable kidney exchange problem},
	url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33121284},
	author = {Klimentova, X and Biró, Péter and Viana, A and Costa, V and Pedroso, J P},
	doi = {10.1016/j.ejor.2022.09.031},
	journal-iso = {EJOR},
	journal = {EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH},
	volume = {307},
	unique-id = {33121284},
	issn = {0377-2217},
	year = {2023},
	eissn = {1872-6860},
	pages = {1391-1407},
	orcid-numbers = {Klimentova, X/0000-0003-1085-0810}
}

@article{MTMT:33047373,
	title = {Online voluntary mentoring. Optimising the assignment of students and mentors},
	url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33047373},
	author = {Biró, Péter and Gyetvai, Márton},
	doi = {10.1016/j.ejor.2022.08.008},
	journal-iso = {EJOR},
	journal = {EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH},
	volume = {307},
	unique-id = {33047373},
	issn = {0377-2217},
	year = {2023},
	eissn = {1872-6860},
	pages = {392-405}
}

@{MTMT:34138628,
	title = {The Large Core of College Admission Markets. Theory and Evidence},
	url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34138628},
	author = {Biró, Péter and Hassidim, A and Romm, A and Shorrer, R I and Sovagó, S},
	booktitle = {EC '22 Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation},
	doi = {10.1145/3490486.3538369},
	unique-id = {34138628},
	year = {2022},
	pages = {958-959}
}

@misc{MTMT:33690766,
	title = {The efficacy of tournament designs},
	url = {https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33690766},
	author = {Sziklai, Balázs and Biró, Péter and Csató, L},
	unique-id = {33690766},
	year = {2022}
}