TY - JOUR AU - Czárán, Tamás AU - Scheuring, István AU - Zachar, István AU - Számadó, Szabolcs TI - Cue-driven microbial cooperation and communication: evolving quorum sensing with honest signaling JF - BMC BIOLOGY J2 - BMC BIOL VL - 22 PY - 2024 IS - 1 PG - 19 SN - 1741-7007 DO - 10.1186/s12915-024-01857-6 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/34767072 ID - 34767072 N1 - Export Date: 12 April 2024 Correspondence Address: Számadó, S.; Department of Sociology and Communication, Egry J. U. 1, Hungary; email: szamado.szabolcs@tk.mta.hu AB - Quorum sensing (QS) is the ability of microorganisms to assess local clonal density by measuring the extracellular concentration of signal molecules that they produce and excrete. QS is also the only known way of bacterial communication that supports the coordination of within-clone cooperative actions requiring a certain threshold density of cooperating cells. Cooperation aided by QS communication is sensitive to cheating in two different ways: laggards may benefit from not investing in cooperation but enjoying the benefit provided by their cooperating neighbors, whereas Liars explicitly promise cooperation but fail to do so, thereby convincing potential cooperating neighbors to help them, for almost free. Given this double vulnerability to cheats, it is not trivial why QS-supported cooperation is so widespread among prokaryotes. LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Zachar, István AU - Máté, Jakab AU - Számadó, Szabolcs TI - Tautology explains evolution without variation and selection. A Comment on: 'An evolutionary process without variation and selection' (2021), by Gabora et al. JF - JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY INTERFACE J2 - J R SOC INTERFACE VL - 21 PY - 2024 IS - 218 PG - 5 SN - 1742-5689 DO - 10.1098/rsif.2023.0579 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/35425884 ID - 35425884 N1 - Funding Agency and Grant Number: Jnos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Funding text: We are thankful to our reviewers for the creative comments and criticism. AB - Gabora and Steel (Gabora L, Steel M. 2021 An evolutionary process without variation and selection. J. R. Soc. Interface 18, 20210334. [doi:10.1098/rsif.2021.0334]) claim that cumulative adaptive evolution is possible without natural selection, that is, without variation and competition. To support this claim, the authors modelled a theoretical process called self-other reorganization (SOR) that envisages a population of reflexively autocatalytic sets that can accumulate beneficial changes without any form of birth, death or selection, that is without population dynamics. The authors claim that despite being non-Darwinian, adaptive evolution happens in SOR, deeming it relevant to the origin of life and to cultural evolution. We analysed SOR and the claim that it implements evolution without variation and selection. We found that the authors, by design, ignore the growth and/or degradation of autocatalytic sets or their components, assuming all effects are beneficial and all entities in SOR are identical and immutable. We prove that due to these assumptions, SOR is a trivial model of horizontal percolation of beneficial effects over a static population. We implemented an extended model of SOR including more realistic assumptions to prove that accounting for any of the ignored processes inevitably leads to conventional Darwinian dynamics. Our analysis directly challenges the authors' claims, revealing evidence of an overly fragile foundation. While the best-case scenario the authors incorrectly generalize from may be mathematically valid, stripping away their unrealistic assumptions reveals that SOR does not represent real entities (e.g. protocells) but rather models the triviality that fast horizontal diffusion of effects can effectively equalize a population. Adaptation in SOR is solely because the authors only consider beneficial effects. The omission of death/growth dynamics and maladaptive effects renders SOR unrealistic and its relevance to evolution, cultural or biological, questionable. LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Számadó, Szabolcs AU - Zachar, István AU - Czégel, Dániel AU - Dustin J., Penn TI - Honesty in signalling games is maintained by trade-offs rather than costs JF - BMC BIOLOGY J2 - BMC BIOL VL - 21 PY - 2023 IS - 1 PG - 16 SN - 1741-7007 DO - 10.1186/s12915-022-01496-9 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33549897 ID - 33549897 N1 - Department of Sociology and Communication, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Egry J. u. 1, Budapest, H-1111, Hungary CSS-RECENS “Lendület” Research Group, MTA Centre for Social Science, Tóth Kálmán u. 4, Budapest, H-1097, Hungary Institute of Evolution, MTA Centre for Ecological Research, Konkoly-Thege Miklós út 29-33, Budapest, H-1121, Hungary Department of Plant Systematics, Ecology and Theoretical Biology, Biology Institute, ELTE University, Pázmány P. sétány 1/C, Budapest, 1117, Hungary Doctoral School of Biology, Institute of Biology, Eötvös Loránd University, Pázmány Péter sétány 1/C, Budapest, H-1117, Hungary BEYOND Center for Fundamental Concepts in Science, Arizona State University, AZ 85287–0506, Tempe, AZ, United States Department of Interdisciplinary Life Sciences, Konrad Lorenz Institute of Ethology, University of Veterinary Medicine, Vienna, Savoynestrasse 1a, Vienna, 1160, Austria Export Date: 3 February 2023 Correspondence Address: Számadó, S.; CSS-RECENS “Lendület” Research Group, Tóth Kálmán u. 4, Hungary; email: szamado.szabolcs@tk.mta.hu AB - Background Signal reliability poses a central problem for explaining the evolution of communication. According to Zahavi’s Handicap Principle, signals are honest only if they are costly at the evolutionary equilibrium; otherwise, deception becomes common and communication breaks down. Theoretical signalling games have proved to be use- ful for understanding the logic of signalling interactions. Theoretical evaluations of the Handicap Principle are difficult, however, because finding the equilibrium cost function in such signalling games is notoriously complicated. Here, we provide a general solution to this problem and show how cost functions can be calculated for any arbitrary, pairwise asymmetric signalling game at the evolutionary equilibrium. Results Our model clarifies the relationship between signalling costs at equilibrium and the conditions for reliable signalling. It shows that these two terms are independent in both additive and multiplicative models, and that the cost of signalling at honest equilibrium has no effect on the stability of communication. Moreover, it demonstrates that honest signals at the equilibrium can have any cost value, even negative, being beneficial for the signaller inde- pendently of the receiver’s response at equilibrium and without requiring further constraints. Our results are general and we show how they apply to seminal signalling models, including Grafen’s model of sexual selection and Godfray’s model of parent-offspring communication. Conclusions Our results refute the claim that signals must be costly at the evolutionary equilibrium to be reliable, as predicted by the Handicap Principle and so-called ‘costly signalling’ theory. Thus, our results raise serious concerns about the handicap paradigm. We argue that the evolution of reliable signalling is better understood within a Darwin- ian life-history framework, and that the conditions for honest signalling are more clearly stated and understood by evaluating their trade-offs rather than their costs per se. We discuss potential shortcomings of equilibrium models and we provide testable predictions to help advance the field and establish a better explanation for honest signals. Last but not least, our results highlight why signals are expected to be efficient rather than wasteful. LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Giardini, Francesca AU - Balliet, Daniel AU - Power, Eleanor A. AU - Számadó, Szabolcs AU - Takács, Károly TI - Four Puzzles of Reputation-Based Cooperation: Content, Process, Honesty, and Structure JF - HUMAN NATURE-AN INTERDISCIPLINARY BIOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVE J2 - HUM NAT-INT BIOS VL - 33 PY - 2022 SP - 43 EP - 61 PG - 19 SN - 1045-6767 DO - 10.1007/s12110-021-09419-3 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/32638620 ID - 32638620 N1 - Funding Agency and Grant Number: Linkoping University; National Research, Development and Innovation Office - NKFIH (OTKA) grantOrszagos Tudomanyos Kutatasi Alapprogramok (OTKA) [K 132250]; European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's research and innovation programmeEuropean Research Council (ERC) [648693] Funding text: Open access funding provided by Linkoping University. S.S. and K.T. were supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office - NKFIH (OTKA) grant K 132250 and by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's research and innovation programme (grant agreement no. 648693). AB - Research in various disciplines has highlighted that humans are uniquely able to solve the problem of cooperation through the informal mechanisms of reputation and gossip. Reputation coordinates the evaluative judgments of individuals about one another. Direct observation of actions and communication are the essential routes that are used to establish and update reputations. In large groups, where opportunities for direct observation are limited, gossip becomes an important channel to share individual perceptions and evaluations of others that can be used to condition cooperative action. Although reputation and gossip might consequently support large-scale human cooperation, four puzzles need to be resolved to understand the operation of reputation-based mechanisms. First, we need empirical evidence of the processes and content that form reputations and how this may vary cross-culturally. Second, we lack an understanding of how reputation is determined from the muddle of imperfect, biased inputs people receive. Third, coordination between individuals is only possible if reputation sharing and signaling is to a large extent reliable and valid. Communication, however, is not necessarily honest and reliable, so theoretical and empirical work is needed to understand how gossip and reputation can effectively promote cooperation despite the circulation of dishonest gossip. Fourth, reputation is not constructed in a social vacuum; hence we need a better understanding of the way in which the structure of interactions affects the efficiency of gossip for establishing reputations and fostering cooperation. LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Számadó, Szabolcs AU - Samu, Flóra AU - Takács, Károly TI - Condition-dependent trade-offs maintain honest signalling JF - ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE J2 - R SOC OPEN SCI VL - 9 PY - 2022 IS - 10 PG - 17 SN - 2054-5703 DO - 10.1098/rsos.220335 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/33205038 ID - 33205038 N1 - Funding Agency and Grant Number: National Research, Development and Innovation Office-NKFIH(OTKA); European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and Innovation Programme [K 132250]; [648693] Funding text: S.S., F.S. and K.T. were supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office-NKFIH(OTKA) grant no. K 132250 (PI: S.S.), and by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and Innovation Programme (grant agreement no. 648693, PI: K.T.). The funding agencies had no role in the study design, analyses or publication AB - How and why animals and humans signal reliably is a key issue in biology and social sciences that needs to be understood to explain the evolution of communication. In situations in which the receiver needs to differentiate between low- and high-quality signallers, once a ruling paradigm, the Handicap Principle has claimed that honest signals have to be costly to produce. Subsequent game theoretical models, however, highlighted that honest signals are not necessarily costly. Honesty is maintained by the potential cost of cheating: by the difference in the marginal benefit to marginal cost for low versus high-quality signallers; i.e. by differential trade-offs. Owing to the difficulties of manipulating signal costs and benefits, there is lack of empirical tests of these predictions. We present the results of a laboratory decision-making experiment with human participants to test the role of equilibrium signal cost and signalling trade-offs for the development of honest communication. We found that the trade-off manipulation had a much higher influence on the reliability of communication than the manipulation of the equilibrium cost of signal. Contrary to the predictions of the Handicap Principle, negative production cost promoted honesty at a very high level in the differential trade-off condition. LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Barclay, Pat AU - Bliege Bird, Rebecca AU - Roberts, Gilbert AU - Számadó, Szabolcs TI - Cooperating to show that you care: costly helping as an honest signal of fitness interdependence JF - PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B - BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES J2 - PHILOS T ROY SOC B VL - 376 PY - 2021 IS - 1838 PG - 12 SN - 0962-8436 DO - 10.1098/rstb.2020.0292 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/32337938 ID - 32337938 N1 - Department of Psychology, University of Guelph, 50 Stone Road E., Guelph, ON N1G 2W1, Canada Department of Anthropology, Pennsylvania State UniversityPA, United States Independent Researcher, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary Department of Sociology and Communication, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary Center for Social Sciences, Eötvös Loránd Research Network (ELKH), Hungary Cited By :8 Export Date: 14 July 2022 CODEN: PTRBA Correspondence Address: Barclay, P.; Department of Psychology, 50 Stone Road E., Canada; email: barclayp@uoguelph.ca LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Számadó, Szabolcs AU - Balliet, D. AU - Giardini, F. AU - Power, E. A. AU - Takács, Károly TI - The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling JF - PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B - BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES J2 - PHILOS T ROY SOC B VL - 376 PY - 2021 IS - 1838 PG - 8 SN - 0962-8436 DO - 10.1098/rstb.2020.0286 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/32286117 ID - 32286117 N1 - Funding Agency and Grant Number: National Research, Development and Innovation Office-NKFIH (OTKA)Orszagos Tudomanyos Kutatasi Alapprogramok (OTKA) [K 132250]; European Research Council (ERC) under the European UnionEuropean Research Council (ERC) [648693] Funding text: S.S. and K.T. were supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office-NKFIH (OTKA) grant no. K 132250. K.T. was supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement no. 648693). LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Számadó, Szabolcs TI - Pre-hunt charade as the cradle of human musicality JF - BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES J2 - BEHAV BRAIN SCI VL - 44 PY - 2021 SN - 0140-525X DO - 10.1017/S0140525X20001077 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/32289861 ID - 32289861 N1 - Department of Sociology and Communication, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Egry J. u. 1., Budapest, 1111, Hungary Centre for Social Sciences (TK CSS), Lendület Research Center for Educational and Network Studies (CSS-RECENS), Tóth Kálmán u. 4, Budapest, 1097, Hungary Evolutionary Systems Research Group, Centre for Ecological Research, Klebelsberg Kuno u. 3, Tihany, 8237, Hungary Export Date: 9 June 2022 CODEN: BBSCD Correspondence Address: Számadó, S.; Department of Sociology and Communication, Egry J. u. 1., Hungary; email: szamszab@ludens.elte.hu Funding details: 2.3.2-15-2016-00057 Funding details: K 132250 Funding text 1: S.S. gratefully acknowledge support from the Hungarian National Research, Development and Innovation Office NKFIH (grant number K 132250). S.S. was supported by the European Structural Investment Funds (ESIF) in Hungary (GINOP) 2.3.2-15-2016-00057. AB - Human language and human music are both unique communication systems that evolved in the human lineage. Here, I propose that they share the same root, they evolved from an ancestral communication system yet to be described in detail. I suggest that pre-hunt charade was this shared root, which helped organize and coordinate the hunt of early hominins. LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - JOUR AU - Wu, Junhui AU - Számadó, Szabolcs AU - Barclay, Pat AU - Beersma, Bianca AU - Cruz, Terence D. Dores AU - Lo Iacono, Sergio AU - Nieper, Annika S. AU - Peters, Kim AU - Przepiorka, Wojtek AU - Tiokhin, Leo AU - Van Lange, Paul A. M. TI - Honesty and dishonesty in gossip strategies: a fitness interdependence analysis JF - PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B - BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES J2 - PHILOS T ROY SOC B VL - 376 PY - 2021 IS - 1838 PG - 9 SN - 0962-8436 DO - 10.1098/rstb.2020.0300 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/32351234 ID - 32351234 N1 - Funding Agency and Grant Number: National Natural Science Foundation of ChinaNational Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) [71901028]; Hungarian National Research, Development and Innovation Office NKFIH (OTKA)Orszagos Tudomanyos Kutatasi Alapprogramok (OTKA) [K 132250]; Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC)Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC)CGIAR [430287]; Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO)Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) [452-17-013]; European Research Council (ERC)European Research Council (ERC)European Commission [771391] Funding text: This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (grant no. 71901028), the Hungarian National Research, Development and Innovation Office NKFIH (OTKA grant no. K 132250), the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC grant no. 430287) and the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) (VIDI grant no. 452-17-013). This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement no. 771391). AB - Gossip, or sharing information about absent others, has been identified as an effective solution to free rider problems in situations with conflicting interests. Yet, the information transmitted via gossip can be biased, because gossipers may send dishonest information about others for personal gains. Such dishonest gossip makes reputation-based cooperation more difficult to evolve. But when are people likely to share honest or dishonest gossip? We build formal models to provide the theoretical foundation for individuals' gossip strategies, taking into account the gossiper's fitness interdependence with the receiver and the target. Our models across four different games suggest a very simple rule: when there is a perfect match (mismatch) between fitness interdependence and the effect of honest gossip, the gossiper should always be honest (dishonest); however, in the case of a partial match, the gossiper should make a choice based on their fitness interdependence with the receiver and the target and the marginal cost/benefit in terms of pay-off differences caused by possible choices of the receiver and the target in the game. Moreover, gossipers can use this simple rule to make optimal decisions even under noise. We discuss empirical examples that support the predictions of our model and potential extensions. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'. LA - English DB - MTMT ER - TY - GEN AU - Keller, Tamás AU - Kiss, Hubert János AU - Számadó, Szabolcs TI - Cheating in primary school. experimental evidence on egodepletion and individual factors TS - experimental evidence on egodepletion and individual factors PY - 2020 PG - 33 UR - https://m2.mtmt.hu/api/publication/31678956 ID - 31678956 LA - English DB - MTMT ER -