https://m2.mtmt.hu/ hun 2026-10-25 16:48 JournalArticle 36850723 VALIDATED true Published online: 02 December 2025 0 false 2026-10-19T15:01:53.723+0000 2026-05-12T19:36:56.233+0000 2026-01-07T09:07:26.258+0000 true 10077554 Vass Johanna /api/admin/10077554 Admin true 2026-06-17T15:47:56.703+0000 2026-02-02T09:20:13.699+0000 true 10072271 Andódy Katalin /api/admin/10072271 Admin true 2026-05-12T19:36:56.219+0000 true 521 Szuper Admin /api/admin/521 Admin true true false true 24 24 /api/publicationtype/24 PublicationType 1 true 24 JournalArticle true 10000059 Article true 24 24 /api/publicationtype/24 PublicationType 1 true 24 JournalArticle /api/subtype/10000059 Szakcikk SubType 101 true 10000059 true 1 /api/category/1 Category true 1 Számadó, Szabolcs A general signalling theory: why honest signals are explained by trade-offs rather than costs or handicaps true true /api/journal/2472 REVIEWED true false 2472 false 2472 true 1010-061X 1420-9101 Journal FOREIGN 39 2 171 189 171 19 2026 Honest signals have long posed a challenge for evolutionary biologists to explain. Here we propose a general Darwinian theory of signalling, Signalling Trade-Off Theory, to explain both honest and dishonest signalling based on recent theoretical and empirical developments. The leading explanation for honest signalling has been the Handicap Principle, which argues that signals are honest because they are costly. We summarize the main reasons why the Handicap Principle—and the related Costly Signalling paradigm—can be fully rejected. Instead, we propose an alternative and more general explanation for honest signalling. The acceptance of the erroneous Handicap Principle was based on misinterpretations of early signalling models. These models contrary to common interpretations, show that signals are honest, not because they are costly (handicaps), but because cheating (deception) is costly. Deception is costly due to differential signalling costs or differential benefits, or more generally differential trade-offs (i.e., an antagonistic constraint between two functions). Trade-offs are the basis evolutionary life-history theory, and we argue that they are also central to explaining signal honesty and deception. Unlike costs, trade-offs can fully represent both aspects of an investment (marginal cost vs. marginal benefit) over different timescales arising in evolutionary analyses. We examine the alternative explanations proposed to explain honest signalling, such as indices and social punishment, and show that these hypotheses require trade-offs, despite being overlooked. We examine more recent theoretical models that demonstrate that signalling trade-offs maintain honesty, even without signalling costs (handicaps) at the evolutionary equilibrium. Moreover, we show that differential trade-offs are both necessary and sufficient to explain honest signals in cases with conflict of interest. Based on these advances, we argue that differential signalling trade-offs provide a general evolutionary explanation for both dishonest and honest signals and also unifies earlier alternative proposals about signal honesty. Finally, we demonstrate that short-term investments under trade-offs at the proximate level (once considered handicap mechanisms) can result in long-term fitness benefits, which thus integrates proximate and evolutionary explanations for signal honesty. We also address how results from sexual selection studies (e.g., terminal investment) are consistent with our theory. true INTERNATIONAL 2026 true true true false true false GOLD 2026-10-19 true https://doi.org/10.1093/jeb/voaf144 9 0 9 9 0 9 8 5 3 5 5 5 5 9 0 0 9 9 9 9 0 13 13 Folyóiratcikk Journal Article 24 9 Könyvrészlet Chapter in Book 25 0 Könyv Book 23 0 Egyéb konferenciaközlemény Conference paper 31 0 Egyéb konferenciakötet Conference proceedings 32 0 Oltalmi formák Protection forms 26 0 Disszertáció Thesis 28 0 Egyéb Miscellaneous 29 0 Alkotás Achievement 22 0 Kutatási adat Research data 33 0 Folyóiratcikk Journal Article 24 0 0 0 Könyvrészlet Chapter in Book 25 0 0 0 Könyv Book 23 0 0 0 Egyéb konferenciaközlemény Conference paper 31 0 0 0 Egyéb konferenciakötet Conference proceedings 32 0 0 0 Oltalmi formák Protection forms 26 0 0 0 Disszertáció Thesis 28 0 0 0 Egyéb Miscellaneous 29 0 0 0 Alkotás Achievement 22 0 0 0 Kutatási adat Research data 33 0 0 0 2026 0 9 9 9 9 Q1 false false false false 2026-01-06T10:58:01.103+0000 Evolúciótudományi Intézet (HUN-REN ÖK); Növényrendszertani, Ökológiai és Elméleti Bioló... (ELTE / TTK / Bio_I); Szociológia és Kommunikáció Tanszék (BME / GTK); Számítógépes Társadalomtudomány Kutatócsoport (ELTE / TK) 2 21 4 3 0 true Language 10002 /api/language/10002 Angol English true 2 true PersonAuthorship 132600675 /api/authorship/132600675 1 0.333 true false true Author 10019188 /api/author/10019188 Számadó Szabolcs DUPLUM true 10019188 true Számadó Szabolcs true false false AuthorshipType 1 /api/authorshiptype/1 0 true 0 true false true PersonAuthorship 132600676 /api/authorship/132600676 2 0.333 false false false Author 10018723 /api/author/10018723 Zachar István true 10018723 true Zachar István true false false AuthorshipType 1 /api/authorshiptype/1 0 true 0 true false true PersonAuthorship 132600677 /api/authorship/132600677 3 0.33333334 false true false Penn Dustin J true false false AuthorshipType 1 /api/authorshiptype/1 0 true 0 true false true PublicationIdentifier 31139940 /api/publicationidentifier/31139940 PlainSource 6 /api/publicationsource/6 PublicationSourceType 10001 /api/publicationsourcetype/10001 true true true DOI DOI https://doi.org/@@@ true true 6 true GOLD true IDENTICAL 10.1093/jeb/voaf144 https://doi.org/10.1093/jeb/voaf144 false true PublicationIdentifier 31259095 /api/publicationidentifier/31259095 PlainSource 1 /api/publicationsource/1 PublicationSourceType 10003 /api/publicationsourcetype/10003 false true true WoS WoS https://www.webofscience.com/wos/woscc/full-record/@@@ true true 1 true IDENTICAL 001661489400001 https://www.webofscience.com/wos/woscc/full-record/001661489400001 false true PublicationIdentifier 31420075 /api/publicationidentifier/31420075 PlainSource 3 /api/publicationsource/3 PublicationSourceType 10003 /api/publicationsourcetype/10003 false true true Scopus Scopus http://www.scopus.com/record/display.url?origin=inward&eid=2-s2.0-@@@ true true 3 true IDENTICAL 105029259302 http://www.scopus.com/record/display.url?origin=inward&eid=2-s2.0-105029259302 false true PublicationIdentifier 31259096 /api/publicationidentifier/31259096 PlainSource 17 /api/publicationsource/17 PublicationSourceType 10003 /api/publicationsourcetype/10003 false true true PubMed PubMed http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=@@@&dopt=Abstract true true 17 true IDENTICAL 41328878 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=41328878&dopt=Abstract false true PublicationIdentifier 31139941 /api/publicationidentifier/31139941 PlainSource 40 /api/publicationsource/40 PublicationSourceType 10006 /api/publicationsourcetype/10006 true true true Egyéb URL Other URL @@@ true true 40 true https://academic.oup.com/jeb/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeb/voaf144/8362708 https://academic.oup.com/jeb/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeb/voaf144/8362708 false true PublicationIdentifier 31466509 /api/publicationidentifier/31466509 PlainSource 40 /api/publicationsource/40 PublicationSourceType 10006 /api/publicationsourcetype/10006 true true true Egyéb URL Other URL @@@ true true 40 true IDENTICAL https://academic.oup.com/jeb/article/39/2/171/8362708 https://academic.oup.com/jeb/article/39/2/171/8362708 false true SjrRating 11657664 /api/sjrrating/11657664 102 0.24 journal RatingType 10002 /api/ratingtype/10002 sjr true true ClassificationExternal 1105 /api/classificationexternal/1105 true 1105 true Q1 FROM_LAST_YEAR true true /api/publication/36850723 <div class="JournalArticle Publication long-list"> <div class="authors"> <img title="Forrásközlemény" style="float: left" src="/frontend/resources/grid/publication-core-icon.png"> <img title="Idézőközlemény" style="float: left" src="/frontend/resources/grid/publication-citation-icon.png"> <div class="autype autype0"> <span class="author-name" mtid="10019188"><a href="/gui2/?type=authors&mode=browse&sel=10019188" target="_blank">Számadó Szabolcs ✉ (<span class="authorship-author-name">Számadó Szabolcs</span> <span class="authorAux-mtmt"> Elméleti biológia, ökológia</span>) </a> </span> <span class="author-affil"><span title="Budapesti Műszaki és Gazdaságtudományi Egyetem">BME</span>/<span title="Gazdaság- és Társadalomtudományi Kar">GTK</span>/Szociológia és Kommunikáció Tanszék; <span title="Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem">ELTE</span>/<span title="Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont">TK</span>/Számítógépes Társadalomtudomány Kutatócsoport</span> ;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class="author-name" mtid="10018723"><a href="/gui2/?type=authors&mode=browse&sel=10018723" target="_blank">Zachar István (<span class="authorship-author-name">Zachar István</span> <span class="authorAux-mtmt"> Evolúcióbiológia</span>) </a> </span> <span class="author-affil"><span title="HUN-REN Ökológiai Kutatóközpont">HUN-REN ÖK</span>/Evolúciótudományi Intézet; <span title="Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem">ELTE</span>/<span title="Természettudományi Kar">TTK</span>/<span title="Biológiai Intézet">Bio_I</span>/Növényrendszertani, Ökológiai és Elméleti Biológiai Tanszék</span> ;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class="author-name" >Penn Dustin J </span> </div> </div> <div class="title"><a href="/gui2/?mode=browse&params=publication;36850723" target="_blank">A general signalling theory: why honest signals are explained by trade-offs rather than costs or handicaps</a></div> <div> <span class="journal-title">JOURNAL OF EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY</span> <span class="journal-issn">(<a target="_blank" href="https://portal.issn.org/resource/ISSN/1010-061X">1010-061X</a> <a target="_blank" href="https://portal.issn.org/resource/ISSN/1420-9101">1420-9101</a>)</span>: <span class="journal-volume">39</span> <span class="journal-issue">2</span> <span class="page"> pp 171-189 </span> <span class="year">(2026)</span> </div> <div class="pub-footer"> <span class="language" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/html">Nyelv: Angol | </span> <span class="identifiers"> <span class="id identifier oa_GOLD" title=" Gold "> <a style="color:blue" title="10.1093/jeb/voaf144" target="_blank" href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jeb/voaf144"> DOI </a> </span> <span class="id identifier oa_none" title="none"> <a style="color:blue" title="001661489400001" target="_blank" href="https://www.webofscience.com/wos/woscc/full-record/001661489400001"> WoS </a> </span> <span class="id identifier oa_none" title="none"> <a style="color:blue" title="105029259302" target="_blank" href="http://www.scopus.com/record/display.url?origin=inward&eid=2-s2.0-105029259302"> Scopus </a> </span> <span class="id identifier oa_none" title="none"> <a style="color:blue" title="41328878" target="_blank" href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=41328878&dopt=Abstract"> PubMed </a> </span> <span class="id identifier oa_none" title="none"> <a style="color:black" title="https://academic.oup.com/jeb/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeb/voaf144/8362708" target="_blank" href="https://academic.oup.com/jeb/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeb/voaf144/8362708"> Egyéb URL </a> </span> <span class="id identifier oa_none" title="none"> <a style="color:blue" title="https://academic.oup.com/jeb/article/39/2/171/8362708" target="_blank" href="https://academic.oup.com/jeb/article/39/2/171/8362708"> Egyéb URL </a> </span> </span> <OnlyViewableByAuthor><div class="ratings"> <div class="journal-subject">Folyóirat szakterülete: Scopus - Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;SJR indikátor:&nbsp;Q1</div> </div></OnlyViewableByAuthor> <div class="publication-citation" style="margin-left: 0.5cm;"> <span title="Nyilvános idézőközlemények összesen, említések nélkül" class="citingPub-count">Nyilvános idéző összesen: 9</span> | Független: 9 | Függő: 0 | Nem jelölt: 0 | WoS jelölt: 5 | Scopus jelölt:&nbsp;3 | WoS/Scopus jelölt:&nbsp;5 | DOI jelölt:&nbsp;8 </div> <div class="publication-citation"> <a target="_blank" href="/api/publication?cond=citations.related;eq;36850723&sort=publishedYear,desc&sort=title"> Idézett közlemények száma: 13 </a> </div> <div class="mtid"><span class="long-pub-mtid">Közlemény: 36850723</span> | <span class="status-data status-VALIDATED"> Egyeztetett </span> Forrás Idéző | <span class="type-subtype">Folyóiratcikk ( Szakcikk ) </span> | <span class="pub-category">Tudományos</span> | <span class="publication-sourceOfData">WOS TAGGED</span> </div> <div class="lastModified">Utolsó módosítás: 2026.05.12. 21:36 Szuper Admin (admin) </div> <pre class="comment" style="margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: 0;"><u>Megjegyzés</u>: Published online: 02 December 2025</pre> </div></div>