Technology has been at the centre of existentialist (e.g. Heidegger) and sociological
(e.g. Marcuse) critique for a long time. The latest versions of criticism rely on
the results of “science and technology studies”: they argue that essentialist conceptualisations
of technology should be replaced while aiming at “democratizing technology” (e.g.
Feenberg). However, even these approaches are characterised by a shortcoming when
it comes to providing a normative basis: as contemporary technology intermeshes with
the elementary levels of existence (such as perception or cognition), it remains in
the blind spot of those users, who could “democratize” it through their critique.
Accordingly, the formal normative bases (e.g. the one provided by Feenberg, who relies
on Habermas’ democracy principle), need to be complemented with substantive claims.
For this purpose, a phenomenological-existentialist framework is elaborated with the
help of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. It is argued that due to the ongoing expansion
of social systems relying on various forms of technology (Luhmann), the “mediated
flesh” becomes rigid. By losing the plasticity of the chiasm, subjects are exposed
to existential crises unmanageable by mere technology (e.g. mental disorders). Such
experience of technologically induced social suffering could serve as a normative
basis for criticising the over-expansion of technology.
