When the European Union was founded, it was assumed that all Member States admitted
as consolidated democracies would maintain their constitutional commitments. In recent
years, Hungary and Poland have challenged this premise as elected autocratic governments
in those countries have captured independent institutions and threatened longterm
democracy. The judiciaries of these countries have been hard hit. In this paper, we
trace what has happened to the judiciaries in Hungary and Poland, showing how first
the constitutional courts and then the ordinary judiciary have been brought under
the control of political forces so that there is no longer a separation of law and
politics. We also explore why the European Union has so far not been able to stop
this process. In the end, the European judiciary, particularly the Court of Justice,
is attempting a rescue of national judiciaries, but the results are so far unclear.
(C) 2018 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All
rights reserved.
