On the edge of anarchism: a realist critique of philosophical anarchism

Szűcs, Zoltán Gábor [Szűcs, Zoltán Gábor (politikatudomány), szerző] Politikatudományi Intézet (HUN-REN TK); Nemzetközi és Európai Tanulmányok Tanszék (ELTE / TATK)

Angol nyelvű Szakcikk (Folyóiratcikk) Tudományos
  • Politikatudományi Bizottság: B nemzetközi
  • Nemzetközi és Fejlődéstanulmányok Doktori Bizottság: C nemzetközi
  • Szociológiai Tudományos Bizottság: C nemzetközi
  • SJR Scopus - Philosophy: Q1
The article examines whether realist theory should adopt a philosophical anarchist position concerning political obligation. The conclusions are mixed. Drawing on a distinction between strong and weak theories of political obligation (in the terminology of the paper, strong theories are committed to morality-based theorizing while weak theories depart from it), the article argues that philosophical anarchism and realist theory are natural allies against strong theories of political obligation but they must part company when it comes to weak theories because it is exactly their departure from morality-based theorizing that can make weak theories especially appealing to realists. In addition, two further objections can be raised against philosophical anarchism on realist grounds: first, philosophical anarchists are drawn to undesirably sweeping conclusions about the non-existence of legitimate political authority or the extreme scarcity of genuine political relations by their Kantian or Lockean background assumptions and, second, Simmons seems to have an implicit weak theory of political obligation which could be, ironically, much more appealing to realists than his overall Lockean anarchism or his sweeping criticism of weak theories. All in all, can a realist be an anarchist? Probably, but definitely not on philosophical anarchist grounds.
Hivatkozás stílusok: IEEEACMAPAChicagoHarvardCSLMásolásNyomtatás
2024-11-04 18:21