The article examines whether realist theory should adopt a philosophical anarchist
position concerning political obligation. The conclusions are mixed. Drawing on a
distinction between strong and weak theories of political obligation (in the terminology
of the paper, strong theories are committed to morality-based theorizing while weak
theories depart from it), the article argues that philosophical anarchism and realist
theory are natural allies against strong theories of political obligation but they
must part company when it comes to weak theories because it is exactly their departure
from morality-based theorizing that can make weak theories especially appealing to
realists. In addition, two further objections can be raised against philosophical
anarchism on realist grounds: first, philosophical anarchists are drawn to undesirably
sweeping conclusions about the non-existence of legitimate political authority or
the extreme scarcity of genuine political relations by their Kantian or Lockean background
assumptions and, second, Simmons seems to have an implicit weak theory of political
obligation which could be, ironically, much more appealing to realists than his overall
Lockean anarchism or his sweeping criticism of weak theories. All in all, can a realist
be an anarchist? Probably, but definitely not on philosophical anarchist grounds.