https://m2.mtmt.hu/ hun 2026-10-23 19:33 JournalArticle 32129383 VALIDATED true 0 false 2026-10-21T14:45:02.471+0000 2025-03-04T07:41:09.416+0000 2021-08-11T13:06:53.502+0000 true 10050123 Bernáth László /api/author/10050123 Author Bernáth László (Filozófia) true 10050123 2025-03-04T07:41:15.818+0000 2025-03-04T07:41:15.818+0000 2025-03-04T07:41:09.423+0000 true 10058046 Hartl Veronika /api/admin/10058046 Admin Hartl Veronika (ELTE BTK FI admin 5) true 10058046 true false true 24 24 /api/publicationtype/24 PublicationType Folyóiratcikk 1 true 24 JournalArticle true 10000059 Article true 24 24 /api/publicationtype/24 PublicationType Folyóiratcikk 1 true 24 JournalArticle /api/subtype/10000059 Szakcikk SubType Szakcikk (Folyóiratcikk) 101 true 10000059 true 1 /api/category/1 Category Tudományos true 1 Bernáth, László true true /api/journal/10001670 REVIEWED METAPHILOSOPHY 0026-1068 1467-9973 true false 10001670 false 10001670 true 0026-1068 1467-9973 Journal 52 3 363 378 meta.12501 363, meta.12501 16 2021 This essay presents an argument, which it calls the Bias Argument, with the dismaying conclusion that (almost) everyone should significantly reduce her confidence in (too many) philosophical beliefs. More precisely, the argument attempts to show that the most precious philosophical beliefs are biased, as the pervasive and permanent disagreement among the leading experts in philosophy cannot be explained by the differences between their evidence bases and competences. After a short introduction, the premises of the Bias Argument are spelled out in the first part. The second part explains why the objections to the Bias Argument are not compelling. Even though the essay does not adopt the conclusion of the Bias Argument, partly because it seems to be self‐defeating, the authors know no plausible way to refute its premises. Thus, the primary aim of the essay is to clarify why the<jats:italic>aporetic</jats:italic>situation of the Bias Argument arises. 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(2021) METAPHILOSOPHY 0026-1068 1467-9973 52 3 363-378<div class="JournalArticle Publication long-list"> <div class="authors"> <img title="Forrásközlemény" style="float: left" src="/frontend/resources/grid/publication-core-icon.png"> <div class="autype autype0"> <span class="author-name" mtid="10050123"><a href="/gui2/?type=authors&mode=browse&sel=10050123" target="_blank">Bernáth László (<span class="authorship-author-name">Bernáth László</span> <span class="authorAux-mtmt"> Filozófia</span>) </a> </span> <span class="author-affil"><span title="Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont">BTK</span>/Filozófiai Intézet; <span title="Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem">ELTE</span>/<span title="Bölcsészettudományi Kar">BTK</span>/<span title="Filozófia Intézet">Fil_I</span>/Logika Tanszék</span> ;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <span class="author-name" mtid="10014075"><a href="/gui2/?type=authors&mode=browse&sel=10014075" target="_blank">Tőzsér János (<span class="authorship-author-name">Tőzsér János</span> <span class="authorAux-mtmt"> Filozófia</span>) </a> </span> <span class="author-affil"><span title="Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont">BTK</span>/Filozófiai Intézet</span> </div> </div> <div class="title"><a href="/gui2/?mode=browse&params=publication;32129383" target="_blank">The biased nature of philosophical beliefs in the light of peer disagreement</a></div> <div> <span class="journal-title">METAPHILOSOPHY</span> <span class="journal-issn">(<a target="_blank" href="https://portal.issn.org/resource/ISSN/0026-1068">0026-1068</a> <a target="_blank" href="https://portal.issn.org/resource/ISSN/1467-9973">1467-9973</a>)</span>: <span class="journal-volume">52</span> <span class="journal-issue">3</span> <span class="page"> pp 363-378 Paper meta.12501. </span> <span class="year">(2021)</span> </div> <div class="pub-footer"> <span class="language" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/html">Nyelv: Angol | </span> <span class="identifiers"> <span class="id identifier oa_GOLD" title=" Gold "> <a style="color:blue" title="10.1111/meta.12501" target="_blank" href="https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12501"> DOI </a> </span> <span class="id identifier oa_none" title="none"> <a style="color:blue" title="128217" target="_blank" href="https://real.mtak.hu/128217"> REAL </a> </span> <span class="id identifier oa_none" title="none"> <a style="color:blue" title="000681760400001" target="_blank" href="https://www.webofscience.com/wos/woscc/full-record/000681760400001"> WoS </a> </span> <span class="id identifier oa_GREEN" title=" Green "> <a style="color:black" title="110456" target="_blank" href="https://edit.elte.hu/handle/10831/110456"> EDIT </a> </span> <span class="id identifier oa_none" title="none"> <a style="color:blue" title="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/meta.12501" target="_blank" href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/meta.12501"> Egyéb URL </a> </span> </span> <OnlyViewableByAuthor><div class="ratings"> <div class="journal-subject">Folyóirat szakterülete: Scopus - Philosophy&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;SJR indikátor:&nbsp;Q2</div> </div></OnlyViewableByAuthor> <div class="publication-citation" style="margin-left: 0.5cm;"> <span title="Nyilvános idézőközlemények összesen, említések nélkül" class="citingPub-count">Nyilvános idéző összesen: 18</span> | Független: 16 | Függő: 2 | Nem jelölt: 0 | WoS jelölt: 1 | Scopus jelölt:&nbsp;2 | WoS/Scopus jelölt:&nbsp;3 | DOI jelölt:&nbsp;10 </div> <div class="mtid"><span class="long-pub-mtid">Közlemény: 32129383</span> | <span class="status-data status-VALIDATED"> Egyeztetett </span> Forrás | <span class="type-subtype">Folyóiratcikk ( Szakcikk ) </span> | <span class="pub-category">Tudományos</span> | <span class="publication-sourceOfData">kézi felvitel</span> </div> <div class="funder"> (BO/00432/18/2) Támogató: MTA Bolyai pályázat, (ÚNKP‐19‐4‐ELTE‐1202) Támogató: Innovációs és Technológiai Minisztérium, OTKA(K132911), OTKA(K123839), OTKA(131998 PD) Támogató: ITM </div> <div class="lastModified">Utolsó módosítás: 2025.03.04. 08:41 Hartl Veronika (ELTE BTK FI admin 5) </div> </div></div>