https://m2.mtmt.hu/ hun 2026-10-24 07:56 JournalArticle 32129174 VALIDATED true 0 false 2026-04-25T20:17:55.485+0000 2025-03-04T07:40:43.411+0000 2021-08-11T11:13:47.671+0000 true 10050123 Bernáth László /api/author/10050123 Author Bernáth László (Filozófia) true 10050123 2025-03-04T07:40:49.746+0000 2025-03-04T07:40:49.746+0000 2025-03-04T07:40:43.418+0000 true 10058046 Hartl Veronika /api/admin/10058046 Admin Hartl Veronika (ELTE BTK FI admin 5) true 10058046 true false true 24 24 /api/publicationtype/24 PublicationType Folyóiratcikk 1 true 24 JournalArticle true 10000059 Article true 24 24 /api/publicationtype/24 PublicationType Folyóiratcikk 1 true 24 JournalArticle /api/subtype/10000059 Szakcikk SubType Szakcikk (Folyóiratcikk) 101 true 10000059 true 1 /api/category/1 Category Tudományos true 1 Bernáth, László true false /api/journal/10055232 REVIEWED PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY 2210-5433 2210-5441 true false 10055232 false 10055232 true 2210-5433 2210-5441 Journal FOREIGN 34 1363 1382 1363 20 2021 It is an increasingly popular view among philosophers that moral responsibility can, in principle, be attributed to unconscious autonomous agents. This trend is already remarkable in itself, but it is even more interesting that most proponents of this view provide more or less the same argument to support their position. I argue that as it stands, the Extension Argument, as I call it, is not sufficient to establish the thesis that unconscious autonomous agents can be morally responsible. I attempt to show that the Extension Argument should overcome especially strong ethical considerations; moreover, its epistemological grounds are not too solid, partly because the justifications of its premises are in conflict. Funding 2001683 /api/funding/2001683 (BO/00432/18/2) Támogató: MTA Bolyai pályázat false true Funding 2001684 /api/funding/2001684 OTKA(131998 PD) Támogató: ITM false true Funding 2001685 /api/funding/2001685 OTKA(K132911) false true Funding 2001686 /api/funding/2001686 Intencionalitás - antik, kora modern és kortárs analitikus(123839) Támogató: OTKA false true true true 2021 true true true false true false GOLD 2026-04-25 true https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-021-00462-7 17 0 17 17 0 16 13 3 0 3 3 3 3 17 0 0 16 16 16 16 0 0 0 Folyóiratcikk Journal Article 24 11 Könyvrészlet Chapter in Book 25 3 Könyv Book 23 1 Egyéb konferenciaközlemény Conference paper 31 0 Egyéb konferenciakötet Conference proceedings 32 1 Oltalmi formák Protection forms 26 0 Disszertáció Thesis 28 0 Egyéb Miscellaneous 29 0 Alkotás Achievement 22 0 Kutatási adat Research data 33 0 Folyóiratcikk Journal Article 24 0 0 0 Könyvrészlet Chapter in Book 25 0 0 0 Könyv Book 23 0 0 0 Egyéb konferenciaközlemény Conference paper 31 0 0 0 Egyéb konferenciakötet Conference proceedings 32 0 0 0 Oltalmi formák Protection forms 26 0 0 0 Disszertáció Thesis 28 0 0 0 Egyéb Miscellaneous 29 0 0 0 Alkotás Achievement 22 0 0 0 Kutatási adat Research data 33 0 0 0 2022 0 5 5 4 4 2023 0 5 5 5 5 2024 0 2 2 2 2 2025 0 4 4 4 4 2026 0 1 1 1 1 D1 A false 10050123 false false false 2021-11-09T12:13:48.910+0000 Filozófiai Intézet (HRN BTK); Logika Tanszék (ELTE / BTK / Fil_I) 1 17 2 1 0 false Language 10002 /api/language/10002 Angol Angol English true 2 true PersonAuthorship 97007697 /api/authorship/97007697 Bernáth, László [Bernáth, László (Filozófia), szerző] Filozófiai Intézet (HRN BTK); Logika Tanszék (ELTE / BTK / Fil_I) 1 1.0 true false false Author 10050123 /api/author/10050123 Bernáth László (Filozófia) Bernáth László true 10050123 true Bernáth László true false false AuthorshipType 1 /api/authorshiptype/1 Szerző 0 true 0 true false true PublicationIdentifier 19082292 /api/publicationidentifier/19082292 DOI: 10.1007/s13347-021-00462-7 PlainSource 6 /api/publicationsource/6 DOI PublicationSourceType 10001 /api/publicationsourcetype/10001 DOI true true true DOI DOI https://doi.org/@@@ true true 6 true GOLD true IDENTICAL 10.1007/s13347-021-00462-7 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-021-00462-7 false true PublicationIdentifier 22129051 /api/publicationidentifier/22129051 EDIT: 82895 SwordSource 92 /api/publicationsource/92 EDIT PublicationSourceType 10007 /api/publicationsourcetype/10007 Repozitórium true true true EDIT EDIT https://edit.elte.hu/xmlui/handle/10831/@@@ true true 92 true GREEN true IDENTICAL 82895 https://edit.elte.hu/xmlui/handle/10831/82895 false true PublicationIdentifier 19082294 /api/publicationidentifier/19082294 Scopus: 85110279307 PlainSource 3 /api/publicationsource/3 Scopus PublicationSourceType 10003 /api/publicationsourcetype/10003 Indexelő adatbázis false true true Scopus Scopus http://www.scopus.com/record/display.url?origin=inward&eid=2-s2.0-@@@ true true 3 true IDENTICAL 85110279307 http://www.scopus.com/record/display.url?origin=inward&eid=2-s2.0-85110279307 false true PublicationIdentifier 19082293 /api/publicationidentifier/19082293 Egyéb URL: https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13347-021-00462-7 PlainSource 40 /api/publicationsource/40 Egyéb URL PublicationSourceType 10006 /api/publicationsourcetype/10006 Link true true true Egyéb URL Other URL @@@ true true 40 true IDENTICAL https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13347-021-00462-7 https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13347-021-00462-7 false true PublicationIdentifier 19082295 /api/publicationidentifier/19082295 Egyéb URL: http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/128236 PlainSource 40 /api/publicationsource/40 Egyéb URL PublicationSourceType 10006 /api/publicationsourcetype/10006 Link true true true Egyéb URL Other URL @@@ true true 40 true IDENTICAL http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/128236 http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/128236 false true MtaRating 10486724 /api/mtarating/10486724 II. Filozófiai Tudományos Bizottság:A PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY 2210-5433 2210-5441 RatingType 10024 /api/ratingtype/10024 II. Filozófiai Tudományos Bizottság FTB Institute 14104 /api/institute/14104 Filozófiai Tudományos Bizottság II. FTO FTB [1901-] 0 false true false Filozófiai Tudományos Bizottság Committee on Philosophy true 14104 true true true A true true SjrRating 11192441 /api/sjrrating/11192441 sjr:D1 (2021) Scopus - History and Philosophy of Science PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY 2210-5433 2210-5441 13 0.1 journal RatingType 10002 /api/ratingtype/10002 sjr sjr true true ClassificationExternal 1207 /api/classificationexternal/1207 Scopus - History and Philosophy of Science true 1207 true D1 DIRECT true true Reference 22120545 /api/reference/22120545 1. Bernáth, L. (2019). Why libet-style experiments cannot refute all forms of libertarianism. In B. Feltz, M. Missal, A. C. Sims (Eds.), Free will, causality, and neuroscience, 97–119. 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(2021) PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY 2210-5433 2210-5441 34 1363-1382<div class="JournalArticle Publication long-list"> <div class="authors"> <img title="Forrásközlemény" style="float: left" src="/frontend/resources/grid/publication-core-icon.png"> <div class="autype autype0"> <span class="author-name" mtid="10050123"><a href="/gui2/?type=authors&mode=browse&sel=10050123" target="_blank">Bernáth László (<span class="authorship-author-name">Bernáth László</span> <span class="authorAux-mtmt"> Filozófia</span>) </a> </span> <span class="author-affil"><span title="Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont">BTK</span>/Filozófiai Intézet; <span title="Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem">ELTE</span>/<span title="Bölcsészettudományi Kar">BTK</span>/<span title="Filozófia Intézet">Fil_I</span>/Logika Tanszék</span> </div> </div> <div class="title"><a href="/gui2/?mode=browse&params=publication;32129174" target="_blank">Can Autonomous Agents Without Phenomenal Consciousness Be Morally Responsible?</a></div> <div> <span class="journal-title">PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY</span> <span class="journal-issn">(<a target="_blank" href="https://portal.issn.org/resource/ISSN/2210-5433">2210-5433</a> <a target="_blank" href="https://portal.issn.org/resource/ISSN/2210-5441">2210-5441</a>)</span>: <span class="journal-volume">34</span> <span class="page"> pp 1363-1382 </span> <span class="year">(2021)</span> </div> <div class="pub-footer"> <span class="language" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/html">Nyelv: Angol | </span> <span class="identifiers"> <span class="id identifier oa_GOLD" title=" Gold "> <a style="color:blue" title="10.1007/s13347-021-00462-7" target="_blank" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-021-00462-7"> DOI </a> </span> <span class="id identifier oa_GREEN" title=" Green "> <a style="color:blue" title="82895" target="_blank" href="https://edit.elte.hu/xmlui/handle/10831/82895"> EDIT </a> </span> <span class="id identifier oa_none" title="none"> <a style="color:blue" title="85110279307" target="_blank" href="http://www.scopus.com/record/display.url?origin=inward&eid=2-s2.0-85110279307"> Scopus </a> </span> <span class="id identifier oa_none" title="none"> <a style="color:blue" title="https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13347-021-00462-7" target="_blank" href="https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13347-021-00462-7"> Egyéb URL </a> </span> <span class="id identifier oa_none" title="none"> <a style="color:blue" title="http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/128236" target="_blank" href="http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/128236"> Egyéb URL </a> </span> </span> <OnlyViewableByAuthor><div class="ratings"> <div class="journal-subject">Folyóirat szakterülete: Scopus - History and Philosophy of Science&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;SJR indikátor:&nbsp;D1</div> <div class="journal-subject">Folyóirat szakterülete: Scopus - Philosophy&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;SJR indikátor:&nbsp;D1</div> <div class="journal-subject">Filozófiai Tudományos Bizottság II. 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