https://m2.mtmt.hu/ hun 2026-10-22 23:06 JournalArticle 32004347 VALIDATED true 0 false 2026-10-21T07:57:20.941+0000 2025-06-17T15:33:53.401+0000 2021-05-07T14:11:42.971+0000 true 10050123 Bernáth László /api/author/10050123 Author Bernáth László (Filozófia) true 10050123 2025-06-17T15:33:55.565+0000 2025-06-17T15:33:55.565+0000 2025-06-17T15:33:53.408+0000 true 10058046 Hartl Veronika /api/admin/10058046 Admin Hartl Veronika (ELTE BTK FI admin 5) true 10058046 true false true 24 24 /api/publicationtype/24 PublicationType Folyóiratcikk 1 true 24 JournalArticle true 10000059 Article true 24 24 /api/publicationtype/24 PublicationType Folyóiratcikk 1 true 24 JournalArticle /api/subtype/10000059 Szakcikk SubType Szakcikk (Folyóiratcikk) 101 true 10000059 true 1 /api/category/1 Category Tudományos true 1 Bernáth, László true true /api/journal/10029570 REVIEWED DISPUTATIO: REVISTA SEMESTRAL DE FILOSOFIA ANALITICA 0873-626X 2182-2875 true false 10029570 false 10029570 true 0873-626X 2182-2875 Journal 12 59 371 394 371 23 2020 This paper outlines a new conative theory of blame. I argue that the best-known conative approaches to blame (Scanlon 1998, 2008, Sher 2006a) misrepresent the cognitive and dispositional components of blame. Section 1 argues, against Scanlon and Sher, that blaming involves the judgment that an act or state is the <jats:italic>fault of</jats:italic> the blamed. I also propose an alternative dispositional condition on which blaming only occurs if it matters to the blamer whether the blamed gets the punishment that she deserves. In Section 2, I discuss objections to judgment-based accounts of blame (that they cannot tell the difference between blaming and judging to be blameworthy, that they cannot explain why blame is often accompanied by emotion, and that they cannot make sense of irrational blame), and I argue that my proposal can handle all of them. Funding 1996573 /api/funding/1996573 OTKA(131998 PD) Támogató: ITM false true Funding 1996574 /api/funding/1996574 (BO/00432/18/2) Támogató: MTA Bolyai pályázat false true true true 2021 true true true false true false GOLD 2026-10-21 true https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0018 2 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 Folyóiratcikk Journal Article 24 1 Könyvrészlet Chapter in Book 25 0 Könyv Book 23 0 Egyéb konferenciaközlemény Conference paper 31 0 Egyéb konferenciakötet Conference proceedings 32 0 Oltalmi formák Protection forms 26 0 Disszertáció Thesis 28 1 Egyéb Miscellaneous 29 0 Alkotás Achievement 22 0 Kutatási adat Research data 33 0 Folyóiratcikk Journal Article 24 0 0 0 Könyvrészlet Chapter in Book 25 0 0 0 Könyv Book 23 0 0 0 Egyéb konferenciaközlemény Conference paper 31 0 0 0 Egyéb konferenciakötet Conference proceedings 32 0 0 0 Oltalmi formák Protection forms 26 0 0 0 Disszertáció Thesis 28 0 0 0 Egyéb Miscellaneous 29 0 0 0 Alkotás Achievement 22 0 0 0 Kutatási adat Research data 33 0 0 0 2024 0 2 2 2 2 Q1 false 10050123 false false false 2021-08-05T14:11:43.802+0000 Filozófiai Intézet (HRN BTK); Logika Tanszék (ELTE / BTK / Fil_I) 1 17 2 1 0 false Language 10002 /api/language/10002 Angol Angol English true 2 true PersonAuthorship 96237020 /api/authorship/96237020 Bernáth, László [Bernáth, László (Filozófia), szerző] Filozófiai Intézet (HRN BTK); Logika Tanszék (ELTE / BTK / Fil_I) 1 1.0 true false false Author 10050123 /api/author/10050123 Bernáth László (Filozófia) Bernáth László true 10050123 true Bernáth László true false false AuthorshipType 1 /api/authorshiptype/1 Szerző 0 true 0 true false true PublicationIdentifier 18756156 /api/publicationidentifier/18756156 DOI: 10.2478/disp-2020-0018 PlainSource 6 /api/publicationsource/6 DOI PublicationSourceType 10001 /api/publicationsourcetype/10001 DOI true true true DOI DOI https://doi.org/@@@ true true 6 true GOLD true IDENTICAL 10.2478/disp-2020-0018 https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0018 false true PublicationIdentifier 22393042 /api/publicationidentifier/22393042 WoS: 000646092100003 PlainSource 1 /api/publicationsource/1 WoS PublicationSourceType 10003 /api/publicationsourcetype/10003 Indexelő adatbázis false true true WoS WoS https://www.webofscience.com/wos/woscc/full-record/@@@ true true 1 true IDENTICAL 000646092100003 https://www.webofscience.com/wos/woscc/full-record/000646092100003 false true PublicationIdentifier 18756158 /api/publicationidentifier/18756158 Scopus: 85102814419 PlainSource 3 /api/publicationsource/3 Scopus PublicationSourceType 10003 /api/publicationsourcetype/10003 Indexelő adatbázis false true true Scopus Scopus http://www.scopus.com/record/display.url?origin=inward&eid=2-s2.0-@@@ true true 3 true IDENTICAL 85102814419 http://www.scopus.com/record/display.url?origin=inward&eid=2-s2.0-85102814419 false true PublicationIdentifier 18756157 /api/publicationidentifier/18756157 Egyéb URL: https://www.sciendo.com/article/10.2478/disp-2020-0018 PlainSource 40 /api/publicationsource/40 Egyéb URL PublicationSourceType 10006 /api/publicationsourcetype/10006 Link true true true Egyéb URL Other URL @@@ true true 40 true IDENTICAL https://www.sciendo.com/article/10.2478/disp-2020-0018 https://www.sciendo.com/article/10.2478/disp-2020-0018 false true SjrRating 10875175 /api/sjrrating/10875175 sjr:Q1 (2020) Scopus - Philosophy DISPUTATIO: REVISTA SEMESTRAL DE FILOSOFIA ANALITICA 0873-626X 78 0.24 journal RatingType 10002 /api/ratingtype/10002 sjr sjr true true ClassificationExternal 1211 /api/classificationexternal/1211 Scopus - Philosophy true 1211 true Q1 DIRECT true true Reference 20301621 /api/reference/20301621 1. 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(2020) DISPUTATIO: REVISTA SEMESTRAL DE FILOSOFIA ANALITICA 0873-626X 2182-2875 12 59 371-394<div class="JournalArticle Publication long-list"> <div class="authors"> <img title="Forrásközlemény" style="float: left" src="/frontend/resources/grid/publication-core-icon.png"> <div class="autype autype0"> <span class="author-name" mtid="10050123"><a href="/gui2/?type=authors&mode=browse&sel=10050123" target="_blank">Bernáth László (<span class="authorship-author-name">Bernáth László</span> <span class="authorAux-mtmt"> Filozófia</span>) </a> </span> <span class="author-affil"><span title="Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont">BTK</span>/Filozófiai Intézet; <span title="Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem">ELTE</span>/<span title="Bölcsészettudományi Kar">BTK</span>/<span title="Filozófia Intézet">Fil_I</span>/Logika Tanszék</span> </div> </div> <div class="title"><a href="/gui2/?mode=browse&params=publication;32004347" target="_blank">Blame and Fault: Toward a New Conative Theory of Blame</a></div> <div> <span class="journal-title">DISPUTATIO: REVISTA SEMESTRAL DE FILOSOFIA ANALITICA</span> <span class="journal-issn">(<a target="_blank" href="https://portal.issn.org/resource/ISSN/0873-626X">0873-626X</a> <a target="_blank" href="https://portal.issn.org/resource/ISSN/2182-2875">2182-2875</a>)</span>: <span class="journal-volume">12</span> <span class="journal-issue">59</span> <span class="page"> pp 371-394 </span> <span class="year">(2020)</span> </div> <div class="pub-footer"> <span class="language" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/html">Nyelv: Angol | </span> <span class="identifiers"> <span class="id identifier oa_GOLD" title=" Gold "> <a style="color:blue" title="10.2478/disp-2020-0018" target="_blank" href="https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0018"> DOI </a> </span> <span class="id identifier oa_none" title="none"> <a style="color:blue" title="000646092100003" target="_blank" href="https://www.webofscience.com/wos/woscc/full-record/000646092100003"> WoS </a> </span> <span class="id identifier oa_none" title="none"> <a style="color:blue" title="85102814419" target="_blank" href="http://www.scopus.com/record/display.url?origin=inward&eid=2-s2.0-85102814419"> Scopus </a> </span> <span class="id identifier oa_none" title="none"> <a style="color:blue" title="https://www.sciendo.com/article/10.2478/disp-2020-0018" target="_blank" href="https://www.sciendo.com/article/10.2478/disp-2020-0018"> Egyéb URL </a> </span> </span> <OnlyViewableByAuthor><div class="ratings"> <div class="journal-subject">Folyóirat szakterülete: Scopus - Philosophy&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;SJR indikátor:&nbsp;Q1</div> </div></OnlyViewableByAuthor> <div class="publication-citation" style="margin-left: 0.5cm;"> <span title="Nyilvános idézőközlemények összesen, említések nélkül" class="citingPub-count">Nyilvános idéző összesen: 2</span> | Független: 2 | Függő: 0 | Nem jelölt: 0 </div> <div class="mtid"><span class="long-pub-mtid">Közlemény: 32004347</span> | <span class="status-data status-VALIDATED"> Egyeztetett </span> Forrás | <span class="type-subtype">Folyóiratcikk ( Szakcikk ) </span> | <span class="pub-category">Tudományos</span> | <span class="publication-sourceOfData">kézi felvitel</span> </div> <div class="funder"> OTKA(131998 PD) Támogató: ITM, (BO/00432/18/2) Támogató: MTA Bolyai pályázat </div> <div class="lastModified">Utolsó módosítás: 2025.06.17. 17:33 Hartl Veronika (ELTE BTK FI admin 5) </div> </div></div>